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Abstract 
  The Canadian chicken industry has operated under supply management since the 
mid-1970s. Canadian consumer preferences for chicken have grown dramatically since 
then possibly in response to concerns about health and the levels of fat and cholesterol in 
red meats. However Canadian consumers are also looking for convenience with their 
food purchases. Canadians are buying their chicken in frozen further processed forms, 
fresh by cut without skin and bone and in a variety of other different ways reflecting their 
unique willingness to pay for various attributes. There is also an increasing trend for 
retailers and processors to brand the fresh chicken product sold through grocery stores 
(for example, Maple Leaf Prime). The preferences Canadian consumer have for various 
chicken products, the prices they are comfortable paying and the strategies followed by 
processors/retailers can directly affect the outcomes of  industry wide strategies such as 
investment in in generic advertising and research or the impact of international market 
changes such as border closures.  
  This research is an intial attempt to quantify Canadian consumer preferences – for 
fresh product by type – for product by level of processing – for chicken product by cut  - 
for fresh chicken by brand - to examine the impact of substitutability on a variety of 
market shocks. The various different disaggregations of Canadian chicken consumption 
are used in a number of simulation models to illustrate how important preferences are to 
producer returns when there are market shocks. If Canadians found all chicken products 
available in the grocery store to be perfectly substitutable then previous policy analysis 
assuming chicken is one homogeneous product would be sufficient for industry policy 
analysis purposes. If Canadians view all the different chicken products as imperfectly 
substitutable and given that various chicken products are produced in relatively fixed 
proportions (white and dark meat, for example) further understanding of how consumers 
make their purchase decisions could enhance the industries ability to predict outcomes.   5
For example, border closing to Canadian exports ( as a result of an Avian influenza 
outbreak, for example) would result in a significant increase in the dark meat products 
available for sale through Canadian grocery stores. The results presented in this research 
could provide a clue as to how much dark meat prices might decline while white meat 
prices might remain unafffected. The results reported suggest that at the consumer level, 
chicken fresh and frozen products are not perceived to be perfect substitutes, within a 
narrow category such as fresh chicken breasts, they are not perceived as even close 
substitutes, within the fresh category branded products such as those developed by 
Lilydale and Maple Leaf are not perceived as perfect substitutes. As well, an initial look 
at the demand for individual chicken products by household suggests that there is far 
from a common buying pattern across Canadian households, even within a single 
province.  
  The results also suggest that health and convenience attributes are driving 
Canadian consumer preferences. Simulation results highlight the fact that  pricing  
strategies followed by major processors/retailers within Canada can influence the returns 
to generic adveritisng and research.  
  Further research could provide additional robust estimates of the chicken product 
substitutability existing in the Canadian market and an increased udnerstanding of the 
market characteristics currently operating. The results presented here suggest that further 
work in this area is important for the chicken industry to pursue. 
 
 
JEL Codes: D12, Q11, Q18 
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Canadian Chicken Industry: Consumer Preferences, Industry Structure and Producer 
Benefits from Investment in Research and Advertising 
BACKGROUND 
  This research project began in July 2003 with a grant from the Poultry Industry 
Council to examine returns to research and product development in the Canadian chicken 
industry. That funding was followed by a commitment of funding from the Co-operative 
Program in Agricultural Marketing and Business and a subsequent grant from the Alberta 
Livestock Industry Development Fund (to examine consumer demand for chicken 
products by product attributes). A large research grant on the socio-economic impact of 
BSE (from the Alberta Prion Research Institute in 2006) ultimately provided the means 
where a very detailed data set on household purchases of meat products for a five year 
period allowed us to undertake some of the sophisticated consumer demand analysis.  
The initial objective of the research was to empirically examine the market 
structure of the Canadian chicken market.  This objective includes modeling consumer 
demand and processor strategic conduct for individual products competing in an 
oligopolistic market.  Apart from aggregate disappearance, consumer behaviour was to be 
examined around a number of different characteristics including: 
- attitudes towards each of the following attributes:  food  safety, nutrition, animal 
welfare and the environment 
- through revealed preference methods characterize individual  consumer   
purchase decision using food diary data 
The estimated models of consumer behaviour, processor behaviour and farm level 
decision making can be used to analyze the size and distribution of benefits from 
producer investments in advertising and research under existing market structures. As 
well, policy and planning for the industry can be based on a more complete 
characterization of consumer preferences.  
  The live stock industry has been and still is today a major contributor to the gross 
domestic income of Canada.  Recently, the livestock industry has seen a disproportionate 
share of challenges with respect to consumers’ perceptions; food safety concerns 
(domestically and internationally); transitions in environmental policy; changes in   7
production practices and technology; and product innovation to encourage the continuing 
growth of consumption of chicken.  In recent years there has been a significant industry 
led/consumer oriented drive to put innovative value-added products on retail shelves. 
Value-added products provide consumers with a wider range of food products that 
address concerns of food safety, nutrition, and quality.    The poultry industry has taken a 
significant leadership role in this era of product differentiation and quality innovation.  
Many of these products contain credence attributes making it difficult, if not impossible, 
for consumers to detect the quality attributes and claims in pre-purchase and post 
purchase evaluations (Hoffman, 2000).  In dealing with these challenges the poultry 
industry must find ways to increase the engagement of consumers within the food chain 
and to provide effective avenues to aid consumers in their evaluation of products 
attributes and claims (Korthals 2001).  Industry supported initiatives must be undertaken 
to quantitatively and qualitatively assess the influence consumers perceptions, beliefs, 
and attitudes have on product evaluation and purchasing decisions (Sunding et al. 2003).  
  Recent outbreaks of animal transmitted diseases (BSE and avian flu); 
advancements in biotechnology and genetic engineering; and food borne illness scares 
(i.e. salmonella and ecoli bacteria) have helped to underscore consumer perceptions of 
food safety as one of the major challenges facing the livestock industry.  Consumer 
perceptions of the perceived risks and dangers associated with livestock commodities has 
dominated debates concerning food safety issues (Myhr and Traavik, 2003).   
  Increased general public awareness of the relationship between diet and lifestyle 
related diseases (i.e. obesity, cardiovascular disease, and cancer) have resulted in an 
increase consumer scrutiny of traditional nutritional aspects of food (i.e. fat, fibre, salt, 
and vitamin content) and nontraditional nutritional attributes of food (i.e. Omega-3 
content) (Urala and Lahteenmaki, 2003).    
  Given this context of evolving consumer preferences the development of 
numerous chicken products is not too surprising. However the development of these 
products, usually by processors, and the resulting distribution economic benefits from 
increasing the number of chicken products available will depend crucially on market 
structure. Market structure can also affect the returns to traditional industry led 
investments in advertising and research. This research will shed light on changing   8
consumer demands for chicken products and the implications of those changing demands 
on market participants, highlighting the impact for chicken producers.  
Overview of the chicken market in Canada.  
Canadian food consumers have an abundant opportunity to select among many different 
foods, this availability and evolving tastes and preferences have resulted in major shifts in 
food disappearance on a per capita basis over time. For example, fruits and vegetables 
have increased dramatically. Meat’s role in overall food per capita consumption is 











     
Source: Statistics Canada (disappearance and trade) 
With a disaggregation of meat disappearance into different animal species it  
becomes clear that the relatively flat trend in per capita meat consumption is generated by 
relatively dramatic changes in individual meats consumed, decreases in beef consumption 
and increases in chicken consumption (Figure 2). Chicken disappearance has been 
increasing since the 1980’s. The chicken market benefited from increasing nutritional 
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concerns about cholesterol since consumers tended to shift away from red meats towards 
‘white’ meat in response to these widely publicized health concerns.  
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    Source: Statistics Canada (disappearance and trade) 
  (DBFP=beef, DPKP=pork,  DCKP=chicken, PCTK= turkey) 
Even with this increasing trend in total chicken disappearance, Canadian chicken 
disappearance on a per capita basis remains significantly lower than that in the U.S.  This 
is similar to the trend in most meat products where per capita disappearance remains 
lower in Canada than in the United States (Figure 3).     10

























           
    Source: Statistics Canada and USDA 
For many years economists have explained the differences in per capita chicken 
consumption between Canada and the U.S on the basis of significantly different prices, 
arising from supply management in the Canadian market. Recent price movements at the 
farm level show little evidence of differences across countries, reflected in a measure of 
consumer support estimate that is very close to zero for much of the period since 1995. 






































    Source: Chicken Farmers of Canada, USDA and OECD   11
Canada’s poultry industry operates under a supply management system. Supply 
management was originally set up by farm groups to address issues of price and income 
stability. In 1970, supply management progressed with the passing of the National Farm 
Products Agencies Act 1970-71-72,c.65,s.1.  The act established the National Farm 
Products Marketing Council and authorized the establishment of national marketing 
agencies for farm products (Agriculture and Agri-foods Canada).  In 1978, the Canadian 
Chicken Marketing Agency (now Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC)) was formed under 
the Farm Products Marketing Agency Act, and through an agreement of the federal 
government, provincial government, and chicken farmers (i.e. the Federal-Provincial 
Agreement for Chicken) was given the authority to regulate chicken production in 
Canada under a system of supply management (CFC, 2000).  Additionally, the Federal 
Provincial Agreement for Chicken formalized provincial institutions that control 
provincial poultry production.  Federal and provincial association relationships are 
maintained by the National Allocation Agreement which sets national production and 
specifies provincial quota allocation (CFC, 1998). Provincial allocations and restrictions 
on inter-provincial trade segregate a national market into provincial arenas. For example, 
market demand for any one area must be satisfied by primary production in that area; 
however, chicken production from one area does not need to be consumed or sold into 
that area.  This means that while farm production in a particular area must satisfy 
demand, finished product may be exported or imported to that area to satisfy final 
consumption.   In this fashion, producer participation is restricted to maintain prices and 
poultry supply, while creating flexibility in the marketing channel for processors and 
retailers to determine their own optimal strategies.  
Canada’s poultry processing industry is becoming increasingly concentrated.  As of 
September 2003 there were 167 (135 in 1998) primary processing plants, of which 59 (63 
in 1998) were federally inspected and 108 (72 in 1998) provincially inspected.  Of these 
167 plants the five largest companies: Flamingo Foods (Coopérative fédérée de Quebec), 
Lilydale Poultry Cooperative, Maple Leaf Poultry, Exceldor, and Maple Lodge Farms, 
accounted for 55% of the poultry processed in Canada.  Maple Leaf is considered the 
single largest firm.  It is note worthy that the list of industries leaders includes three 
producer cooperatives, Lilydale Poultry Cooperative, Flamingo Foods (owned by Coop   12
Fédère) and Exceldor (Quebec coop created through the acquisition of and merger with  
Dorchester Cooperative; Saint-Damase Cooperative; La Poulette Grise; Produits Quatre 
Étoiles and Laurentian Regional Poultry Processing Plant ). The poultry processing sector 
is not only characterized by increasing concentration, but also by organizations with 
different organizational structures, investor owned firms (IOFs) and producer 
cooperatives. 
The importance of differentiating between IOFs and producer cooperatives is 
derived from their unique objective functions.  In the long run, an IOF seeks to maximize 
profit while producer cooperatives intend to maximize member welfare through a 
combination of cooperative profit and producer surplus.  The variation in objective 
functions has numerous implications for pursuing optimal strategies in pricing and 
advertising. 
  The grocery retail industry, like the poultry processing industry, is becoming  
increasingly concentrated.  The growth of national retailers such as Sobeys and Loblaws, 
at the expense of regional or independent retailers, has created immense opportunity for 
the creation of market power.  The four largest Canadian retailers have 60.05% of the total 
Canadian grocery market.  Unlike the processing sector, the retail sector is not marked by 
major cooperatives with the exception of the Co-op chain at 3.58% market share. 
 
Table 1. Grocery Sales and Market Share for Canada’s Retailers: 2002. 
 
Canadian Grocery Retailer     Billion $    Can Market Share 
Loblaw      23,894       32.03% 
Sobeys      10,960       14.69% 
Safeway       5,492         7.36% 
Metro        5,201         6.97% 
Overwaitea       2,380         3.19% 
A&P        4,400         5.90% 
C-Store       3,250         4.36% 
Costco  Food       3,550         4.76% 
Drug        2,659         3.56% 
Wal-Mart         2,758                                          3.70% 
Co-Op        2,667         3.58% 
Mass  Merc.,  Indep,  others     7,389         9.90% 
Total                    74,600                100.00% 
Source: Canadian Grocer 2003-2004 Executive Report. 
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  In Canada chicken has traditionally been sold in a number of forms: generic (fresh 
or frozen), whole chickens or chicken parts (purchased by retailer butchers with no 
distinguishing characteristics from one grocery store to another), and branded processed 
products (including Janes, Flamingo and Schneiders).  Recently the major national 
processor, Maple Leaf, has been aggressively pursuing a strategy of ‘branding’ fresh 
product (Naturally Prime) based on production attributes and identifying labels. Lilydale, 
a major western Canadian chicken processor has followed a similar strategy with their 
Llydale Gold brand for fresh chicken.  Grocery store chains faced with the possibility of 
proliferation of branded fresh products, and additional costs associated, must make 
decisions about pricing generic product, from whom to purchase it, whether to stock one 
or more brands, and what markup to assign.  The proliferation of brands may affect 
stocking decisions on processed branded products due to consumer substitution 
possibilities.  Other processors in the chicken industry are faced with making strategic 
decisions of whether to brand their product or continue providing store generic product. 
  Processors and retailers in the Canadian chicken market must satisfy final 
consumers from domestic supply plus imports (in many cases processors and retailers are 
the ‘owners’ of importing rights). Since the WTO in January 1995, traditional import 
quotas have been transferred into tariff rate quotas and imports have been gradually 
increasing. At the same time the chicken industry has pursued a strategy of encouraging 
exports. From Figure 5 the developing trends in imports and exports to and from the 
Canadian chicken industry are clear. Chicken imports are growing at the industry agreed 
upon rate (under trade regulations) while there has been a dramatic increase in exports 
over the past 12 years.     
    Table 2: Canadian Exports of Chicken Products, Various Years 
   1997 2001 2006
Chicken / Poulets                      kg 
  Live  (Evis.  Wt.) N/A N/A N/A 
 Carcass  1,378,002 1,969,565  82,487 
  Bone-in breast, raw  0 1,436 2,502 
  Bone-in legs, raw  0 48,407,886 38,083,168 
  Bone-in wings, raw  0 3,012,175 2,417,422 
 Bone-in  parts  29,789,865 740,285  1,680,100 
  Boneless breast, raw  0 3,703  130,611 
 
Boneless, burgers, 
strips, nuggets  1,121,243 68,392  308,606   14
 Boneless  parts  488,293 209,031 138,872 
 Others  Bone-in  11,099,811 10,654,649  3,506,547 
 
Others Boneless-
MSM  10,181,848 13,607,091 16,216,865 
 
Others Boneless-
Giblets  1,225,827 446,318 127,511 
 Others  Boneless  1,317,350 316,199  1,488,593 
Total     56,602,239 79,436,730 64,183,284 
   
  Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Poultry Market Review, various issues 
 






































  Source: Chicken Farmers of Canada Databook    15
Research Statement 
The Canadian chicken market has recently been facing significant changes, consolidation 
in Canadian processing and retailing, changing trade agreements, increasing imports and 
dramatically increasing exports, and evolving Canadian consumer preferences for 
different types of chicken products. The research in this report attempts to provide an 
empirical assessment of many of these changes with simulation modeling used to 
highlight the important of any measured relationships for industry strategy. Evolving 
consumer preferences within Canada will be measured using: 
     Alberta  household  purchases  of  chicken by product type (fresh, processed parts, 
meal(kabobs etc.), burgers, nuggets and strips, wings) – linked to prices and household 
demographics – using household purchase data for 2005. 
    Canadian preferences for types of chicken breasts (boneless, skinless etc.) – linked to 
prices, nutrition attributes – using national scanner data 
    Canadian preferences for chicken product type (23 fresh and frozen products) – linked 
to prices to establish substitutability among types – using national scanner data. 
All of these measures of consumer preferences are new to the Canadian literature. The 
demand for chicken product by type will provide the basis of a synthetic simulation 
model of the entire Canadian chicken market used to examine the impact of exogenous 
factors – changes in beef prices, reductions in volume of exports – on Canadian chicken 
producers, consumers, processors welfare. The model will capture both Canadian 
consumer preferences by product and the joint nature of chicken products produced in the 
marketplace (relatively fixed ratios of dark to light meat).  
The changing structure of the Canadian chicken market will be examined using a game 
theoretic model of pricing interactions for fresh branded chicken products. Actual data on 
how major firms play pricing games will provide the basis for an examination of the 
impact of industry research and advertising investment given the empirically established 
structure of the Canadian industry. Future planning for strategic development in the 
industry can be enhanced through the simulation analysis reported.  
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CANADIAN CHICKEN CONSUMPTION 
Revealed Preference Analysis: Alberta 
One type of analysis that can be conducted to examine consumer preferences for chicken, 
at the household level, is revealed preference analysis. This analysis makes use of  actual 
household or individual purchase data, recorded over time by panels recruited by market 
research companies (occasionally similar analysis is undertaken by organizations such as 
Statistics Canada, but their samples are usually one-off and do not contain a history of 
purchases for the same household).  In this research AC Nielsen Homescan © 
data was purchased on all meat products for Canada for five years, 2001-2005. The data 
contained all individual meat purchases, classified by size, by package size, by brand and 
by type. As well household demographic data, including average age of head of 
household, number of children, income for each household, education, language spoken 
were also recorded.  
For the reported analysis the chicken products purchased by households in Alberta were 
the focus. These households’ annual purchases were identified for the year 2005. In total 
703 households were observed in Alberta, who purchased chicken in the year 2005. It is 
noteworthy that the full data set included more than chicken purchases. There are an 
enormous number of meat products purchased through grocery stores including fresh 
products of all types, processed products, deli products both through the deli counter and 
through the store shelves.  However, for this analysis the study was limited to purchases 
of chicken, with all purchases across a year aggregated into a single purchase of each of 
six chicken product types.  Five choice alternatives were identified: (1) fresh chicken 
(aggregated in this sample from all individual fresh chicken products) (2) processed 
chicken parts (breaded breasts etc.) (3) chicken meal products ( kabobs etc.) (4) chicken 
burgers (5) chicken nuggets and strips and (6) chicken wings. These products were 
aggregated into groups from a variety of individual branded products.   
One of the tasks involved in using panel data is with the construction of the vector prices 
faced by each consumer on each purchase occasion. The basic problem is that one only 
observes the price paid by the consumer for the chicken products that he/she actually 
purchased. Prices for other products are inferred. If it was the case that a panellist did not   17
purchase any of the alternatives during the year, we used the average price of that 
particular chicken product experienced by other panellists as the price that he or she 
could have faced had he/she decided to purchase a particular chicken product. Baltzer 
(2004) used a similar approach when he was faced with the missing values for price. 
Baltzer argues that this solution has the advantage of being theoretically plausible as well 
as having no impact on the parameter estimates.   
 





 $/lb  Alberta  
Fresh 3.94 
Processed   8.13 
Meal 11.82 
Burger 5.69 
Nuggets and Strips  8.67 
Wings 7.38 
 
Table 3 shows the average price of processed chicken products to be much higher than 
fresh. The higher prices associated with the further processed chicken products may be a 
reflection of additional costs involved in partially preparing products, closer to final 
consumption.   
Data Setup for Multinomial Logit Model with Number of Purchase Occasions Per 
Chicken Product Type as the Dependent Variable 
 
  In this data set up, the frequency decision was used as the dependant variable. The 
chicken products purchased were summed up across all time periods for product type, for 
2005, creating a frequency variable (number of  purchases by type). A summary of 
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Table 4. Chicken Product Purchases Per Household: Alberta  
Chicken Product Type 
# of 
Households  Minimum Maximum  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Fresh  (number of times)  650  0  46  7.53  6.68 
Processed  (number and weight)  300  0  105  11.63  12.38 
Meal (number and weight)  27  0  10  2.56  2.25 
Burger (number and weight)  94  0  86  5.61  9.76 
Nuggets and strips (number and 
weight) 
139 
0 35  5.18  5.37 
Wings (number and weight)  141  0  93  6.42  9.84 
 
Table 4 shows that most households purchased fresh chicken for 2005. 300 households 
purchased a lot of processed chicken products (chicken breast breaded or in sauce, for 
example). Only 27 households purchase the highly processed chicken meal type item. 
Approximately 100 households purchase burgers, nuggets and wings. There is a large 
variability in the volume of product purchased by each household as evidenced by the 
high standard deviations.   
Conditional Logit Model with Frequency as the Dependant Variable 
The dependant variable frequency is equal to the total volume of chicken products 
purchased  for 2005. By using frequencies, one can account for the multiple product 
purchases by a household at one purchase occasion.  
In the conditional logit model postulated, chicken product purchase by type is assumed to 
be dependent on a set of socio-economic variables and prices of the different chicken 
products. The estimated coefficients  j β  for all ) ,..... 1 ( J j j = , after normalizing the 
“normal alternative” 0 = j , measure the effect of the explanatory variables in the indirect 
utility function on the likelihood of choosing chicken product typeirelative to the 
“normal option”. In this case chicken burger was chosen as the normal option. Estimates 
from the equation are reported in Table XXXX. Estimates with a negative sign imply the 
preference for the “no purchase” option while estimates with a positive sign imply the 
preference for a particular type of chicken product.  
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Table 5. Conditional Logit Regression Estimates for Frequency Model 
 Alberta 
Variable Parameter  t-values 
PRICE -.4567**  -5.98 
Fresh Chicken   
Household Income  -.0003 -.043 
Presence of children  -.335 -1.54 
Education  .431** 10.155 
Price  .545** 7.23 
Processed Chicken   
Household Income  -.013* -1.79 
Presence of children  .524* 2.22 
Education  .215** 4.68 
Price  .348** 4.49 
Chicken Meal   
Household Income  -.037* -1.78 
Presence of children  -.006 -.009 
Education  .08616 .795 
Price  -.074 -.474 
Nuggets and Strips 
Household Income  -.025* -2.73 
Presence of children  1.19** 4.212 
Education  .211** 3.906 
Price  .121 1.36 
Wings    
Household Income  -.0357** -4.06 
Presence of Children  .919** 3.34 
Education  .0394 .733 
Price  .422** 5.209 
Log-likelihood                                  -6021.47 
Number of observations    703 
χ
2 (15)    25.00 
**  p < .05  * p < .10 
 
For Alberta, the price coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that increasing 
price decreases the probability of a household purchasing any chicken product. Price 
interactions with alternative specific constants are also included in the model, 
highlighting that demand for fresh chicken at the household level is extremely inelastic   20
(summed coefficient almost equal to one). The coefficient on the income variable is 
negative and significant for all of the types of chicken product, suggesting a lack of 
growth potential as incomes grow (relative to the omitted product chicken burgers).  
           The coefficients on the presence of children are positive and significant for the 
majority of the processed chicken products, possibly suggesting the need for convenience 
in households with children present. The coefficients on education are positive for many 
of the chicken products, with the largest coefficient on fresh chicken. Perhaps the 
additional education is linked to an increased understanding of health attributes 
associated with each of the chicken products and consumers are trying to avoid some of 
the attributes (salt, fat) that accompany processed products.  
Willingness to Pay Revealed Preference Analysis 
From the revealed preference analysis willingness to pay for a certain type of chicken 
product can be calculated from the regression coefficients. These numbers are shown in 
Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Calculated Willingness to Pay, at the mean of all explanatory variables 
 
 
From the willingness to pay, which allows the chicken product comparison, there are not 
large differences in preferences for the various chicken products, relative to the excluded 
product, chicken burger. The value can be interpreted as follows: consumers would be 
willing to pay $.82 more than the current price for fresh chicken ($3.94) to receive equal 
utility to chicken burger. Clearly the chicken meal type items, which have the most 
processing, appeal to a limited cross section of the population. The processed chicken 
pieces (including both flavoured and breaded products), nuggets and strips and wings 
Chicken Product Type Alberta
$/lb 
Fresh Chicken  0.82 
Processed Chicken  1.02 
Chicken Meal  -.45 
Nuggets and Strips  1.15 
Wings 1.13   21
share a very common willingness to pay, that is slightly higher than fresh chicken’s WTP 
above chicken burgers.  Different aggregations of the various chicken products by 
nutritional content similarities (there are some categories such as processed chicken 
which could be further subdivided by the type of processing) could further illuminate 
nutritional attributes and determine willingness to pay on that basis. Comparisons to the 
data for other provinces may be interesting since previous data on eggs has shown some 
significant differences between preferences in Alberta and Ontario.  
Aggregate Analysis Of Chicken Breast Consumption By Type: 
Canada 
An AC Nielsen Market Track © data set on fresh and processed chicken products for 
Canada from mid 2000 to late 2003 was examined to quantify the demand for chicken 
breasts. Increasingly fresh chicken products are being sold in grocery stores in a variety 
of forms – without skin, without bone, without either. Some of the nutritional concerns 
associated with chicken concern the level of fat that is found within the skin. If 
consumers are becoming increasingly health conscious then are they willing to pay more 
over time for the additional effort involved in removing skin from chicken pieces before 
purchase. Does the additional removal of bones add to the value or appear to be an 
attribute that consumers in general are looking for? 
One source of information about the nutritional attributes of individual chicken 
breast products is the USDA National Nutrient Database for Standard Reference 
(http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site_main.htm?modecode=12-35-45-00 ). For two types 
of chicken breast – with skin and without skin, the nutrients associated with the edible 
portion are presented in Tables 7 and 8. There is a relatively dramatic difference in the 
total lipid (fat) associated with each product. However the nutritional content of the raw 
chicken breast is only one part of the ‘healthy’ nature of the product, the cooking method 
used in final food preparation can significantly affect the final nutritional quality of the 
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  Table 7 Chicken, broilers or fryers, breast, meat and skin, raw: Nutrient Value 







Proximates         
Water   g  69.46 29  0.278
Energy   kcal  172 0   
Energy   kj  720 0   
Protein   g  20.85 29  0.148
Total lipid (fat)   g  9.25 29  0.243
Ash   g  1.01 29  0.058
Carbohydrate, by difference  g  0.00 0   
Fiber, total dietary   g  0.0 0   
Sugars, total   g  0.00 0   
Source: USDA 
  Table 8 Chicken, broilers or fryers, breast, meat only, raw: Nutrient Value 







Proximates         
Water   g  74.76 31  0.228
Energy   kcal  110 0   
Energy   kj  460 0   
Protein   g  23.09 32  0.194
Total lipid (fat)   g  1.24 40  0.086
Ash   g  1.02 28  0.025
Carbohydrate, by difference  g  0.00 0   
Fiber, total dietary   g  0.0 0   
Sugars, total   g  0.00 0   
 Source:  USDA 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The data on sales of chicken breasts by type for Canada over the period 2000 to 2003 
were analyzed using a linear version AIDS two stage demand system.  Although meat 
demand scanner data studies can use any type of functional form the Rotterdam model   23
(Nayga and Capps, 1994) and the AIDS model (Eales and Unnevehr, 1988) are two 
common ones. The AIDS model satisfies the axioms of consumer choice and allows for 
consistent aggregation of  micro-level demands up to a market-level demand function 
(Eales and Unnevehr, 1988). There are a number of heroic assumption underlying the 
specification of a two stage demand model, such as the products identified in the model 
are weakly separable from all other products, in this case other chicken products, other 
meats and all other goods.  In essence it is possible to separate the consumer choice 
model for the selected goods from all other products consumers purchase.  
The general form of the first stage total expenditure equation is:  
TEXPi = ∑i PiQi = f  ( PSTAR,TIME , TEXP(-1))                                                                                     
      i  =  1,2,…,n.  individual  products 
 P i =   real price of individual chicken breast products i 
 Q i =  quantity consumed of chicken breast product i 
  PSTAR= expenditure share weighted price index for all types of chicken breast                                    
         products; 
     TIME= time trend 
     TEXP(-1) =     lagged total expenditure one period. 
 
The general form of the second stage equations of the AIDS model share equation is: 
 
ωi = αi + Σj γij ln (pj) +  JiQt(-1) + BiTEXP + XiTime + βiIn(TEXP/P) 
 
where  ωi = expenditure share on the i
th commodity 
   p j  = are commodity prices  
    Qt(-1) = lagged quantity 
    TEXP = total expenditure 
    TIME = time .  
 
and 
 ln(P)  =  α0 + Σjαiln(pi) + ½ Σi Σj γij ln(pi)ln(pj).  
Applying the basic demand restrictions of homogeneity, adding up, and symmetry 
directly on the parameters of the model we get: 
  Σiαi= 1   Σiγij = 0   Σiβi = 0     adding-up 
  Σjγij = 0                                  homogeneity 
  γij = γji                symmetry  
 
which can be tested or imposed.   24
To simplify estimation the nonlinear price term is replace by the Stone index or PSTAR 
from the first stage equation described above. Both first and second stage equations 
include terms for habit formation and time trends. Other explanatory variables such as 
prices of other chicken products, other meat products advertising are not included in this 
initial analysis because the analysis is conducted at such at a disaggregated level.  
  There are eight different types of fresh chicken breast to be found in the scanner 
data on sales within Canada, including: 
  Bone-in Skin-on, Bone-in Skinless, Bone-in Unspecified, Boneless Skin-on, Skin-
on Bone unspecified, Skinless Bone Unspecified, Remaining. It is clear from this list that 
there are a few types of chicken breast that clearly cannot be classified as ‘healthier’ than 
others due to lack of information on whether they are skin on or not. The mean quantities 
and prices of the eight products are shown in Table 9 below.  
Table 9: Aggregate per Capita Quantity Consumed and Mean Price over 160 weeks, 
2000-2003  
Product  Per Capita Quantity Mean Price
 kg  $/kg 
All chicken breast  5.12  11.07 
Bone in Skin on  1.59  9.85 
Bone in Skinless  .33  7.79 
Bone in Skin unspecified  .07  12.55 
Boneless Skin on  .40  13.30 
Boneless Skinless  2.07  12.62 
Skinless bone unspecified  .20  8.63 
Skin-on bone unspecified  .07  7.47 
Remaining .39  11.01 
 
From the table there is wide variability in the consumption levels of the various products 
with the remaining (or more likely unspecified) category representing a fairly large share. 
Prices may reflect the additional work involved in preparing the fresh product for sale, 
with the boneless product selling at the highest prices for the category.    25
  The results from estimation are highlighted in the Price (Table 10), Substitution 
Elasticity (Table 11) and Time Trend (Table 12) tables to follow. The price elasticities 
show very elastic responses to own price (as would be expected from this very 
disaggregated data). However the expenditure elasticities (showing how much 
expenditure will be spent on each individual good if expenditure on all chicken breasts 
increased by 1 %) highlight some dramatic differences between the various types of 
chicken breasts. Two products identified as skinless have some of the highest expenditure 
elasticities. There seems to be somewhat less interest in the boneless category with the 
boneless skinless chicken breast, a relatively small and expensive category only having 
an expenditure elasticity of approximately 1, as compared to other skinless categories 
with expenditure elasticities of over 2. In the table presenting Substitution elasticities the 
vast majority of the different types of chicken breast are shown to be net substitutes, 
signifying that consumers are willing to substitute one for the other as relative prices 
change. The table presenting the time trend coefficients shows first of all that there is a 
discernable trend upward in chicken breast consumption even over a three year period. 
Second the time trend coefficients on some skinless products are some of the largest, 
signifying that over this period these skinless categories were growing the fastest.   26
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Remaining               -13.22 
(-9.80) 
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Table 12 : Regression Coefficients on Time Trend in Various Equations 
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Canadian Chicken Aggregate Demand Analysis by Product Type
1 
This section will present a detailed conceptual and empirical framework that will be used 
to complete the analysis of Canadian chicken consumption, in aggregate, by chicken 
product type.  Weak separability is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
assumption that consumer follow a two stage budgeting procedure. It allows for the 
disaggregation of products into groups where the marginal rate of substitution between 
goods in the same group is independent of the quantities being consumed in other groups. 
In the first stage of a multi-stage budgeting process a consumer will allocate income 
across broad commodity groups such as (food, clothing, shelter etc.). Then in successive 
stages further allocations of income within the broad commodity groups are made until 
the decision gets down to individual commodities. The stages of the decision process are 
conducted as if they are a simultaneous utility maximization procedure (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980).  
  The study of Canadian chicken demand will be based on the  assumption that at 
the first stage meat is separable from all other goods and at the second stage chicken is 
separable from all other meats, these are maintained assumptions. The dependant variable 
in the first stage of the demand system is specified as the log of total expenditure on 
chicken as a function of a set of logged independent variables such as prices of the 
different chicken products, other meats, personal disposable income, and seasonal 
dummy variables (the seasonal dummies are not logged). As well, there have been a 
number of exogenous shocks to the meat demand system and previous research (Lomeli, 
2005) has shown that food safety media coverage, as well as animal disease media 
                                                 
1 The material in this section is largely taken from an unpublished Masters thesis by Christopher Panter, 
2005.   30
coverage both have the potential to affect consumer demand. In this case these factors, 
relevant to chicken, will be included in the aggregate demand for chicken equation. The 
general form of the first stage total expenditure equation is:  
 
TEXPi = ∑i PiQi = f(PSTAR,PB,PP,INDEX,PDI,BSE,TEXP(-1),SD)                                                         
      i  =  1,2,…,n.  individual  products 
 P i =   real price of individual chicken products i 
 Q i =  quantity consumed of chicken product i 
  PSTAR= expenditure share weighted price index for all types of chicken                                              
         products 
     PP=   price of pork 
     PB=   price of beef 
     INDEX=   food safety index 
     PDI=    personal disposable income  
     BSE=     BSE dummy variable 
     TEXP(-1) =     lagged total expenditure one period 
     SD=    seasonal dummy variables 
      
Variables will be dropped in estimation based on significance of variable coefficients and 
to obtain significance and correct signs on critical variables such as price. The 
expenditure weighted price index (P) is a Stone price index and is linear, facilitating 
easier estimation of the AIDS model. The scanner data provides very detailed price and 
quantity information for specific products, with many products, so simplifying 
aggregations are made to make the dataset manageable. The basic aggregated groups in 
the fresh and frozen categories are estimated in the second stage of the demand system. In 
the second stage it is a maintained assumption that chicken is separable from all other 
meats so that when the decision has been made to buy chicken the consumer is only faced 
with different product choices consisting of chicken. At the second stage of the model a 
system of share equations illustrating the demand for each type of chicken product as a 
function of the goods’ own price, prices of other chicken products, total expenditure,   31
seasonal dummies and time. Other variables such as the food safety index, BSE, are also  
included and tested: 
 
 w i =   PiQi/TEXP = g(Pi,TEXP, SD, Time)  i = 1,2,…,n. individual products. 
 
  Within Canadian chicken demand the broad categories of chicken products are 
frozen (further processed) and fresh. Brand information exists for all of the frozen 
products and some of the fresh. The remaining fresh chicken is generic and is not given a 
brand name in the dataset. It is far too complicated to attempt estimation of a demand 
system for all the products identified through their respective brands so major chicken 
product categories are estimated instead. Many of the products are relatively new and 
were not offered for sale during some period in the data and other specific products were 
discontinued over the estimation period. Therefore, estimation will be attempted on the 
major product groupings highlighted in the AC Nielsen Market Track© data. In both the 
fresh and frozen categories, variables are created that take into account products that do 
not fit well in any of the defined categories. These variables are titled mix (short for 
mixture) in the frozen group, and ast (short for assorted) in the fresh group.  
  Previous studies by Eales and Unnevehr (1988) and Nayga and Capps (1994) 
break down chicken products into whole birds and fresh plus further processed parts, and 
breasts, parts, and other chicken respectfully. Since our study only looks at chicken a 
more detailed breakdown is possible. The following table provides a summary of the 
variable names and abbreviations plus the number of individual chicken products that 
were aggregated to form that variable. 
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Table 13. Table of Aggregated Chicken Product Variables from the ACNielsen 
Scanner Data.  
 


















VBFC 0.8%  13  Frozen 
Breaded natural 
chicken 
BNC 1%  31  Frozen 
Flavored 
chicken breasts  
FCB 0.5%  28  Frozen 
Un-flavored 
chicken breasts 
UFCB 2%  30  Frozen 
Chicken wings   WNGS  3%  64  Frozen 
Stuffed chicken  SC  0.3%  11  Frozen 
Un-breaded 
chicken burgers  
BUGU 0.5%  15  Frozen 
Breaded chicken 
burgers 
BUGB 0.9%  25  Frozen 
Breaded chicken 
parts 
PART 0.08%  13  Frozen 
All other frozen 
chicken 
MIX 1.2%  56  Frozen 
Whole chicken  whole  21%  56  Fresh 
Breast brst  24%  116  Fresh 
Drumsticks drum  7.7%  28  Fresh 
Wings wing  4.2%  33  Fresh 
Burger burg  0.08%  3  Fresh 
Legs legs  13%  33  Fresh 
Winglettes wingt  0.1%  4  Fresh 
Kabobs   kabob  0.3%  4  Fresh 
 Nuggets  nugg  0.06%  4  Fresh 
Drumettes drumt  0.5%  6  Fresh 
Thighs thigh  7.7%  39  Fresh 
Fresh chicken 
remaining  
ast 5%  85  Fresh 
                                                                                 Source: AC Nielsen© 2003. 
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Due to the small size of some categories in the fresh products they were combined 
with other larger product groups. For instance drumettes + winglettes were put in the 
wing group and fresh chicken halves and chicken quarters were placed in the assorted 
group. It should be noted that mechanically separated meat for products such as hot dogs 
and deli meat are not included in the scanner data.  
In order for chicken to be aggregated together the assumption has to be made that 
all the prices for the individual parts move together in the same proportion. This 
assumption may be too strong considering the demand profile for chicken has changed 
dramatically in the last 30years. In 1976 people only ate approximately16kg. of chicken 
per year, today they eat double that and much of the increased demand has come from 
further processed products which add value by offering consumers convenience in meal 
preparation. Retail stores also sell more individual parts so that consumers can choose 
from a range of differentiated products and focus on only one part of the chicken. The 
price differences between higher demanded white meat and lower demanded dark meat 
parts can be significant and price fluctuations do not always move in the same direction 
or proportion, in fact white meat prices have been going up while dark meat prices have 
gone down. 
In this study once the consumer has decided to purchase chicken at the grocery 
store there are 23 different types of products. This model assumes that fresh and frozen 
chicken are substitutes. Another possibility could involve recognizing a distinction 
between the fresh and the frozen products at the store. Once the decision to purchase 
chicken is made the consumer chooses between weakly separable groups of fresh and 
frozen product.   34
 
The Complete AIDS Model  
 
 The general structure of the 2-stage AIDS models share equation is: 
ωi = αi + Σj γij ln (pj) + ΣkqikSD + JiQt(-1) + Kisafety  + FiBSE                                
+BiTEXP + XiTime + βiIn(TEXP/P) 
 
where  ωi = expenditure share on the i
th commodity 
   p j  = are commodity prices  
    SD= seasonal quarterly dummy variables  
    Qt(-1) = lagged quantity 
    Safety = food safety index 
    BSE = BSE dummy variable 
    TEXP = total expenditure 
    TIME = time   
 
and 
 ln(P)  =  α0 + Σjαiln(pi) + ½ Σi Σj γij ln(pi)ln(pj) 
is the logarithmic price index.  
  The model is  linear except for the price index which is often hard to estimate 
econometrically, the price index will be approximated with the Stone Index  ln(P) = Σωk 
ln pk to avoid the simultaneity problems. The model is estimated with an iterative 
seemingly unrelated regression estimator with the last share equation dropped because of 
the adding up restriction. 
Since the data is time series some potentially serious problems may exist. According 
to Green (2003) times series data is often autocorrelated so that the variation around the 
regression function is related from one period to another. Therefore, the model is 
estimated with autocorrelation corrections built in to avoid this problem. The model is 
estimated using SUR and maximum likelihood procedures. The program used for 
conducting the estimation is TSP version 4.5.    35
The data used for estimation of the AIDS model is the AC Nielsen © weekly 
scanner data that was provided for the Canadian retail chicken market.  The data on 
chicken parts retail price, quantity, and value were given for many individual fresh and 
frozen products. The dataset for the model is from November 11, 2000 to November 1, 
2003 for a total of 156 weeks. All of the products for the frozen subgroup were branded 
but in the fresh subgroup both branded and generic product are included. The individual 
product list illustrates the sheer volume of products, 411 fresh and 311 frozen items of 
various brands, and package sizes were aggregated to form 11 and 12 commodity groups 
respectfully (see Table 14). Since the scanner data is national in scope regional 
differences in regional demand cannot be discovered which is a potential problem since 
some of the individual items may not be sold in all regions of the country. Figure 5 
illustrates that price differences exist for the same product in different regions of the 
country. However as compared to aggregate disappearance data which contains no 
product disaggregation, scanner data provides greater insight into some of the more 
intricate aspects of the demand profile at the retail level.   
Table 14: Average Retail Price for Twenty Three Commodity Groups Estimated in 















Breaded Natural Chicken (BNC)  3  Frozen 12.20
Flavored Chicken Breasts (FCB)  4  Frozen 12.28
Un-flavored Chicken Breasts (UFCB)  5  Frozen 10.34
Chicken Wings (WNGS)  6  Frozen 10.93
Stuffed Chicken (SC)  7  Frozen 15.72
Un-breaded Chicken Burgers (BUGU)  8  Frozen 5.82
Breaded Chicken Burgers (BUGB)  9  Frozen 8.34
Chicken Parts (PART)  10  Frozen 10.06
All other Frozen Chicken (MIX)  11  Frozen 7.69  36
Whole (whole)  12  Fresh 5.09
Breasts (brst)  13  Fresh 11.06
Drumsticks (drum)  14  Fresh 4.28
Wings (wing)  15  Fresh 6.50
Burger (burg)  16  Fresh 5.43
Legs (legs)  17  Fresh 2.79
Winglettes (wingt)  18  Fresh 5.35
Kabobs (kabob)  19  Fresh 12.19
Nuggets (nugg)  20  Fresh 7.20
Drumettes (drumt)  21  Fresh 8.48
Thighs (thigh)  22  Fresh 5.71
Assorted Fresh (ast)  23  Fresh 5.57
Source: ACNielsen© 2003 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of Chicken Product Retail Price: Alberta and Ontario 
 






































































g Ont BLSL Breast
AB BLSL Breast
Ont leg (with back)
AB leg (with back)
 
  Source:  Agriculture  Canada Poultry Market Review 2003 
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General Consumption Trends for Fresh and Frozen Chicken  
 
It is interesting to examine some of the basic trends and descriptive statistics for 
each of the twenty three product groups to see if any predominant trends or predictions 
can be made about the results. From the aggregate per capita disappearance data, 
presented earlier, it is evident that total chicken consumption is increasing but this may be 
due to food service taking an increasing share of the meat dollar, hence it is of interest to 
examine retail consumption trends for fresh and frozen chicken purchased through 
grocery stores. Examining Figure 6 the weekly trend in frozen processed chicken 
consumption; a significant upward trend in total amount consumed even over the short 
time period of the data can be seen. From the trend line it can be seen how in every week 
consumption of frozen chicken has been increasing by about 784 kg. Since much of the 
new product development is concentrated in this area the upward trend is not surprising 
but still relatively small compared to the upward trend in fresh chicken consumption as 
illustrated in Figure 7. The level of fresh chicken consumption and the rate of growth is 
much higher than frozen chicken,  fresh consumption increases in total by approximately 
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Figure 6: Frozen Chicken Product Trend 
 
Weekly Trend In Total Frozen Processed 















       Source:  ACNielsen©  2003 
 
Figure 7: Fresh Chicken Product Trend 
 
 
Weekly Trend in Total Fresh Chicken 
















                 Source: ACNielsen© 2003   39
 
New product introductions over the period of the sample (2000-2003) are of 
interest as well. There are a large number of new chicken processed products introduced 
into the market that remain in the market for less than 30 weeks. This represents a 
relatively large share of new product introductions that are not successful reflecting high 
transactions costs. In Figure 8 the longevity of the 160 new chicken processed products 
introduced into the market place is highlighted. 91 of these products remain in the market 
for less than 30 weeks while 140 remain in the market continually after their introduction.  




















In terms of quantity, fresh chicken comprises 85% of the retail market and frozen 
chicken only accounts for 15% as illustrated by Figure 9. Frozen chicken is a diverse and 
dynamic area where many of the products are focused on convenience and include 
microwavable dinners like “cordon bleu”, “kiev”, and other marinated and breaded   40
products. Very little frozen chicken is in a raw unprocessed form such as frozen utility 
birds. Another important observation is that except for wings, burgers and perhaps some 
specific products in the MIX category almost all frozen chicken is white meat.  
Figure 9: Fresh and Frozen Chicken Market Share 
 









      Source:  ACNielsen©  2003 
 
 
Data presented in Figure 10 illustrates the breakdown of the 23 different product 
categories presented in this study.  Except for very small categories on the fresh side like 
winglettes, kabobs, nuggets, and burgers almost all of the commodity groups on the 
frozen side are smaller than any commodity group on the fresh side. Frozen wings and 
premium priced breaded formed chicken are the two largest groups on the frozen side and 
breasts are the largest category on the fresh side illustrating white meats’ high demand. 
Surprisingly whole birds still make up the second largest commodity group at 21% of 
total retail chicken. On the graph value share was placed right beside quantity share to see 
if the two are proportional to one another; generally they are not. Only for certain   41
products like frozen burgers, parts, and mix do they exist in equal proportion. For every 
commodity group except value priced breaded formed chicken the value shares are 
greater than the quantity shares. This may be because many of the frozen products are 
white meat which is the higher valued meat and it may reflect the fact that people are 
paying for additional convenience. On the other hand, most fresh chicken groups except 
for breast meat, kabobs, and winglettes have quantity share exceeding value share. Major 
dark meat categories like legs, thighs, and drums, also exhibit this trend.  
Figure 10: Share of Chicken Sales by Product Type 
 


















































































































         
 
Source: ACNielsen© 2003 
 
The average price (unit values) for the twenty three different chicken products 
vary greatly, where frozen further processed items are higher priced as compared to fresh 
(see Table 14). The price for dark meat is lower then the price of breast meat indicating 
that the demand profile for these two meats and their associated products could differ   42
substantially. Figures 11 and 12 highlight some of the dramatic differences in major 
groups, the differences between white and dark meat products and fresh and frozen 
product.  
 
Figure 11: Comparison of Fresh and Processed Chicken Prices 
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Figure 12: Comparison of White versus Dark Meat Chicken Prices 


































































































































       Source:  ACNielsen©  2003 
 
 
In the model to be estimated identified above, food safety was hypothesized to be a factor 
affecting both the total expenditure on chicken and the individual expenditure shares for 
chicken by product type. The data for a food safety index was generated from print media 
database searches over the sample period of the data presented. The databases were 
searched for articles linking chicken consumption and food safety considerations such as 
E. Coli, Salmonella and Camplyobacter. As can be seen from Figure 13 coverage of these 
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Figure 13: Print Media Coverage of Major Food Safety Issues Related to Chicken 
 
Graph of E.coli, Salmonella, and Campylobacter 



























































































































































































Estimation of Parameter Results for the AIDS Model 
  The model was estimated across the two stages simultaneously. At the first stage, 
the price of beef and the food safety index were not significant at the 10% confidence 
level or less, suggesting little relationship between aggregate chicken expenditure and 
these variables. The price of pork coefficient is significant and negative implying a 
complementary relationship since if the price of pork increases the consumption of 
chicken will decrease. The food safety index was not significant at the 10% confidence 
level at the first stage so as the incidence of E.coli, Salmonella and Campylobacter   45
reporting increases the level of chicken consumption does not necessarily go down 
implying that people generally do not respond to these food safety concerns at the macro 
level. The lagged total expenditure coefficient is positive, significant and between zero 
and one indicating habit persistence, if consumers purchased chicken last week they are 
likely to purchase it this week. All three of the seasonal dummy variables are significant 
and positive implying that the least amount of chicken is consumed in the fall and more is 
consumed in the other seasons relative to the fall. Both Thanksgiving and Christmas 
occur in the fall for the dataset and on both occasions big meals tend to be served with 
turkey being the bird of choice. In the time of the year where the most turkey is 
consumed less chicken might be purchased. The BSE dummy variable is significant at the 
first stage and has a positive sign indicating the weeks after the BSE incident (May 2003) 
spurred consumers to purchase more chicken which on the surface appears to be a logical 
result. Personal disposable income is also statistically significant and positive implying 
that as a persons’ income rises they will purchase more chicken.
2   
  At the second stage of the model, some of the significant time trend coefficients 
were positive which is expected since chicken consumption in general is increasing. 
However, others like breaded natural chicken, frozen parts, fresh drumettes, burger and 
assorted fresh chicken had a significantly negative time trend. This implies that while 
overall chicken consumption is on the increase , at the individual product level the trends 
are not uniformly positive. 
  The food safety index coefficients at the second stage did not have a significant 
effect on any of the individual products. Since no specific product recalls occurred over 
the time period of the data for chicken, many of the included articles focused on warning 
                                                 
2 Statistical Significance or significant, refers to the 10% level unless stated otherwise in the text.   46
people to cook the meat properly. The non-threatening nature of the articles is probably 
the cause of the low effect at the second stage. E.coli, Salmonella, and Campylobacter 
can be killed easily with proper preparation techniques, potentially explaining why the 
impact was weak.   
  Seasonal trends still exist in the individual chicken product consumption. Products 
that had a consistently significant seasonal trend in all three quarters include VBFC, FCB, 
PARTS, whole, brst, and assorted fresh. FCB is a frozen white meat product where more 
is consumed in the winter relative to the fall. Frozen PARTS experiences its highest 
consumption in the fall. On the fresh sub-group side, whole birds are still mostly 
consumed in the fall quarter. Whole birds come in two types, fryers and roasters where 
roasters are larger. Around Thanksgiving and Christmas more roasters are sold possibly 
because they substitute well for a small turkey.  
  Frozen wings are also seasonal with more sold in the fall. This is not surprising 
considering wings are a popular food served at informal gatherings and as the weather 
gets cooler outside less barbequing occurs. Fresh breast meat is consumed more in the 
spring than in any other season. Frozen burgers both breaded and un-breaded are 
consumed significantly more in the spring and summer than in the fall. Fresh burgers are 
consumed more in the spring than in any other season. Frozen burgers both breaded and 
un-breaded are consumed significantly more in the spring and summer than the winter or 
fall due again to the increase in outdoor cooking activity. BNC shows an opposite trend 
to that of burgers where more is consumed in the winter than the spring or summer, this 
trend holds for PBFC as well.      47
  The BSE dummy variable had some results, first that the outbreak has not caused 
consumers to purchase more chicken across the board for every chicken product. Some 
products had positive coefficients while others had negative. On an individual product 
basis PBFC and BNC went down and so did wings on both the frozen and fresh side. 
Products that experienced gain include fresh burgers and nuggets and frozen un-breaded 
burgers . In the aftermath of the outbreak consumers appear to have been searching for 
products that can substitute well with beef. However, the time of the discovery also needs 
to be taken into account since mid May is the typical start of the Canadian BBQ season so 
consumers could have been drawn to these particular products for that reason alone. 
However, BBQ items were not the only ones to experience gain, fresh nuggets along with 
frozen FCB consumption were also higher after BSE. FCB is a commodity group that 
consists of highly marinated and processed breast meat, a product not suitable for the 
BBQ but would substitute nicely for a steak on the dinner plate. Recall that the chicken 
purchased at the retail store increased after BSE as indicated in the first stage of the 
demand system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Canada was the only country where a 
BSE outbreak actually encouraged more beef consumption. There also may be two 
classes of consumers in the marketplace that responded differently to the BSE outbreak. 
One group may have responded by purchasing more beef from unconventional sources 
and the other group may have responded by purchasing more chicken from the retail store 
specifically the products that substitute well with beef. Many of the products with 
increased demand are higher end white meat items. It may be that consumers at the retail 
store turned away from beef and more traditional breaded chicken products and wings for   48
higher processed white meat. Before making any strong conclusions scanner data would 
need to be studied for both chicken and beef over a much longer period of time.  
  Table 15 presents the own and cross price effects for each of the twenty three 
products. Most of the own price effects are significant except for, legs, kabobs, nuggets, 
drumettes, thighs, and assorted fresh chicken. The fresh products that did not have 
significant own price effects are either very small in terms of consumption level or dark 
meat. Many of the cross price effects are significant as well, but the coefficients can 
either be positive or negative in sign. If the cross price effect is positive that implies the 
goods may be substitutes and if the effect is negative the goods may be complements.    49
Table 15 Own and Cross Price Chicken Product Elasticities Across Both Stages
3. 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11
p1 -2.86874*** 0.239049 0.255253** 0.412342** 0.063058 0.100998 -0.716556** 0.575023** -0.600091*** -0.429377 0.477307***
p2 -0.229889*** -0.070087 -0.212493*** 0.015766 -0.137902*** 0.294459*** -0.117078 -0.4305*** 0.014648 0.077767 -0.012656
p3 -0.021309 -0.507363*** -3.67913*** 0.110247 0.011802 0.1485*** 0.221117 0.059092 0.691058*** 0.230588 0.174437**
p4 -0.123359*** 0.018054 0.010381 -2.01616*** -0.064385 0.320625*** -0.048935 0.052848 0.084507 -4.22E-03 -8.02E-03
p5 -0.027292 -0.166372 0.085781 0.073483 -5.00045*** 0.561751*** -0.054394 0.054116 0.044516 0.317599 -0.333238
p6 -0.03609 -0.365674* 0.120086 0.713122*** 0.80649*** -2.17425*** -0.268617 0.552811** 0.175371 0.582271 0.141403
p7 -0.306851*** -0.143151 0.042993 -0.034928 -0.105507* 0.22791*** -1.59967*** 0.170807 0.476808*** -0.137383 0.059757
p8 -0.250094*** -0.367989*** -0.045331 0.026777 -0.119165* 0.451984*** 0.106749 -0.159946 0.018527 0.106121 -0.037967
p9 -0.277077*** 0.041503 0.415835*** 0.123995* -0.052172 0.188408*** 0.792847*** 0.073034 -2.27836*** 0.26702 1.74E-03
p10 -1.0261*** 0.011486 -0.154539*** 0.0186 -0.387278* 1.73537*** -0.027223 0.039375 0.024105 -3.89284*** 0.027951
p11 -0.025034 -0.018703 0.098838** 7.78E-04 -0.207748** 0.162075** 0.122599 -0.079563 2.70E-03 0.235095* -1.9027***
p12 0.123759* 0.017513 0.155945** 0.254182* 0.732363*** -0.208684* -0.221416 -0.028015 0.449424*** -0.127059 0.373348*
p13 0.354597*** -0.020651 0.188659 0.193651 1.72092*** 0.67548*** 0.553304* -0.372799 0.321616* 0.464967 0.332331
p14 0.089134* -0.253421 -0.034722 -2.32E-03 -0.175705 0.294049*** -0.164884 -0.343172 -0.117943 0.582236 -0.121269
p15 -0.068107 -0.061376 -0.055806 -0.115409 0.217915** 0.135891* 0.021796 -0.202023 -0.201004* 0.116814 -0.091183
p16 -1.79204*** 3.63E-03 -0.288619*** 0.038468*** -0.701911* 3.13974*** 0.016359 0.051791** -8.18E-04 2.39E-03 0.013281
p17 -0.113033 0.120346 -0.014109 0.030678 0.091532 9.40E-03 0.024152 -0.114814 -0.120876 0.015715 0.405918*
p18 -0.94352*** -0.032793 -0.152843*** 0.025062*** -0.365611* 1.59929*** -5.14E-03 3.92E-03 0.012374 0.161088** -4.76E-03
p19 -0.080675 9.24E-03 3.26E-03 -0.080913 -0.041065 0.357616*** 0.412091** -0.184715 0.021639 0.395973* -0.183558*
p20 -2.00649*** 0.040799** -0.328716*** 0.045996*** -0.780635* 3.52067*** -0.029026** 0.059712*** 6.91E-03 -0.025467 0.02617
p21 -0.26414*** 0.180142 -0.028779 0.082862*** -0.043701 0.316261*** 0.060716 0.079687 0.106103 0.221744 -0.022072
p22 0.115299 0.091885 0.290309** -0.143294 -0.293439 0.280832** -0.406229* -0.655136*** 5.37E-03 -0.592286 -0.144189




                                                 
3 Products 1 through 23 are identified in Table 14.   50
Table 15 cont. Own and Cross Price Chicken Elasticities Across Both Stages. 
p12 p13 p14 p15 p16 p17 p18 p19 p20 p21 p22 p23
p1 -0.399618*** 0.51163*** 0.152643*** 0.038233 0.266626 -0.105586 0.017164 1.41718*** 0.042969 -0.210611 0.118967* 0.192534*
p2 -3.15875*** 6.89534*** -0.135907*** 0.068506*** 0.08925 -0.202735*** -0.111181 0.022827 0.451922*** 0.172703 -0.081699 -0.028399
p3 -1.08301*** 2.01076*** -0.058758 4.42E-03 0.17052 -0.09297*** 0.104903 0.166555 -0.011639 0.070609 0.030084 0.041971
p4 -2.10092*** 4.38644*** -0.088019*** 0.012348 4.12E-03 -0.156876*** 0.067918 -0.100877 0.026068 0.120808*** -0.100995*** -0.099258***
p5 -0.541049*** 1.16078*** -0.132549 0.21601*** -0.11232 1.60E-03 0.176294* 0.330103 -2.69E-03 0.306788*** -0.172379* -0.047273
p6 -0.608558*** 0.517359*** 0.22113** 0.124676 0.189868 -0.115789 0.669413*** 0.579995 -0.34697* 0.222267 0.133184 -0.407588***
p7 -2.59528*** 5.53009*** -0.118189*** 0.061011 0.21108* -0.181082*** 5.67E-03 0.473554** -0.309338*** 0.07985 -0.127959*** 6.32E-04
p8 -3.76324*** 8.31806*** -0.157107*** 0.069424*** 0.208575 -0.263376*** -0.018491 -0.131693 0.267812** 0.062967 -0.149786** 0.034693
p9 -1.59616*** 3.23941*** -0.101711*** -0.032017 -6.27E-03 -0.157788*** 0.166833 0.068401 0.109324 0.218004* -0.070924* -0.107142***
p10 -14.4267*** 33.8254*** -0.330917*** 0.481071*** 8.86E-03 -0.840737*** 0.152699** 0.109435*** -0.047483 0.067429 -0.231467 -0.048615
p11 -1.39903*** 2.76084*** -0.103554** -0.010941 -0.125864* -0.020266 -0.080503 -0.356853* 0.050668 -0.020707 -0.100253** -0.088892*
p12 -1.77531*** 0.023204 0.03603 -0.110381* -0.142047 -0.029568 -0.292728*** 0.38795 0.024702 -0.304036*** -0.026556 0.117322
p13 -0.406344*** -1.47563*** -0.136972 0.164141 -0.533211*** 0.065712 0.023651 0.211365 -0.031245 0.042662 -0.248447* 0.035598
p14 -0.497094*** 0.539644*** -1.50574*** 0.066409 0.026625 -0.320122*** 0.543742** -0.181799 0.052233 0.541981*** 0.106766 -0.021665
p15 -0.635986*** 0.718737*** -2.67E-03 -1.36324*** -0.098811 -1.24E-03 0.066046 -0.287981 -0.450893*** -0.041457 0.027554 -0.035164
p16 -25.8943*** 61.2223*** -0.590593*** 0.884193*** -0.548443*** -1.48339*** 0.221427*** 0.087537*** 0.07323** 0.028395 -0.35541 -0.056993
p17 -0.470002*** 0.49307*** -0.320619*** 0.114108 -0.26684** -0.939589*** 2.31E-03 -0.304593 -0.052976 -0.086448 -0.366528*** -0.087271
p18 -13.3209*** 31.1701*** -0.309428*** 0.437775*** 0.427793*** -0.781656*** -0.59884*** 0.037231* 0.039054 -0.023934 -0.220376 -0.050588
p19 -2.84607*** 6.15917*** -0.13179*** 0.012437 0.240325** -0.243147*** 0.039814 -0.860996*** -0.209516** -0.024095 -0.109154* -0.205645***
p20 -29.0234*** 68.7037*** -0.656502*** 0.991437*** 0.066179** -1.65427*** 0.021189 0.051103** -1.03473*** 0.052815** -0.388826 -0.055845
p21 -2.8689*** 6.14936*** -0.034234 0.053415** -0.174031 -0.215245*** -0.217496 -0.020645 -7.23E-03 -0.987709*** -0.109373** -0.048814*
p22 -0.437521*** 0.302617*** 0.16716* 0.149163** -0.095485 -0.451554*** -0.518742** -0.147112 0.146549 -0.168622 -1.06347*** -5.41E-03
p23 -0.518195*** 0.63436*** -0.042611 2.64E-03 -0.014368 -0.124775 -0.058001 -1.09447*** 0.196288* -0.025424 -0.039834 -0.974472*** 
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Table 16 Expenditure Elasticities Across Both Stages. 
 
Across Both Stages
Parameter Estimate S.E. Significance
YB1 0.645366 0.103619 ***
YB2 0.722165 0.116049 ***
YB3 0.759932 0.107908 ***
YB4 0.756214 0.146837 ***
YB5 0.60686 0.331611 *
YB6 0.304857 0.133523 **
YB7 0.831498 0.170863 ***
YB8 0.72569 0.143654 ***
YB9 0.745332 0.127134 ***
YB10 0.724425 0.176534 ***
YB11 0.880158 0.193023 ***
YB12 1.05732 0.110062 ***
YB13 0.74692 0.098697 ***
YB14 0.91549 0.112173 ***
YB15 0.699078 0.103421 ***
YB16 0.583413 0.134578 ***
YB17 0.916724 0.128508 ***
YB18 0.73351 0.11959 ***
YB19 0.804359 0.3112 **
YB20 0.741722 0.117499 ***
YB21 0.506353 0.12394 ***
YB22 0.918779 0.114185 ***
YB23 0.789556 0.110176 ***
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Table 17 Own and Cross Substitution Elasticities  
 
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11
s1 -49.5821*** 5.48038* 6.67727*** 8.17094*** 3.32308 2.08374 -11.9916** 10.6351** -9.81403*** -6.35431 9.7622***
s2 -10.5321 -27.5772*** 3.70951 -4.21896 -5.86869 -18.8538 -76.3075*** 5.10366 15.4835 -6.08E-03
s3 -206.369*** 7.13743* 5.16953* 4.34436* 13.8856 3.62935 40.8402*** 14.6428 11.3822***
s4 -232.964*** 3.13377 14.3097*** -4.04766 6.45928 11.8107* 1.08773 0.983147
s5 -159.845*** 17.6469*** -0.61978 1.96381 2.70648 11.8201 -9.63026
s6 -41.3942*** -4.0696 10.7391** 4.48547 12.6132 3.78056
s7 -228.543*** 24.9078 70.8873*** -18.1705 10.6871
s8 -33.9224 6.70627 24.3125 -5.72842
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Table 17 Own and Cross Substitution Elasticities Cont. 
s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20 s21 s22 s23
s1 2.61461*** 2.50986*** 4.83731*** 1.66513 5.0653 0.615931 -0.063838 25.6019*** 1.8044 -3.7565 4.29351*** 5.20277***
s2 1.18217* 0.993654** -4.20538 -0.400391 16.1631 3.40514 -20.0359 3.31685 81.4828*** 30.5933 2.55984 3.01231
s3 2.81807*** 2.22646*** 1.35833 0.774943 9.93903 1.77462 5.6349 9.34463 0.37841 4.21305 6.54638*** 5.57165***
s4 2.24607** 1.06143 0.626374 -2.23225 0.737493 1.24232 7.58766 -11.9788 4.09637 14.1814*** -1.6159 -5.99585*
s5 6.53852*** 6.15366*** -1.40472 8.04535*** -3.44019 3.93627 5.37487 10.566 0.941289 10.1175*** -2.55155 0.701656
s6 -1.04753 2.00086*** 6.33754*** 3.36478* 3.8408 0.398384 12.4345*** 10.8809 -5.61785 4.33838 4.73151** -6.07058***
s7 -0.456753 2.43143*** -2.3946 1.66222 30.6652* 1.52648 0.538985 67.7413** -43.4545*** 11.5629 -5.34883 6.75021
s8 -0.069074 -0.884012 -7.06972 -4.95491 44.7568 -2.01299 -4.19013 -29.2301 58.1977** 13.0148 -10.1719*** 16.9492*
s9 3.95476*** 1.81665*** -1.33877 -3.92001 -0.304473 -1.15979 14.2932 5.81839 10.6287 19.2941* 1.18135 -4.99783
s10 0.624093 2.67988*** 13.7505 4.44697 7.91537 1.76778 127.544** 64.9223* -38.4904 37.0247 -7.86331 0.394931
s11 3.38601** 1.76961** -1.46187 -1.17723 -9.29409* 8.75317** -6.42001 -27.1752* 4.88815 -1.35956 -1.23314 -2.81597
s12 -8.20291*** 1.23785*** 1.70749*** 0.021741 -0.731376 1.53771** -2.3091*** 2.27252 1.1775* -1.96651*** 1.25202** 2.02347***
s13 -2.63249*** 0.935409*** 1.06672*** -1.20839** 1.69101*** -0.330998 0.265758 0.93106** 0.120139 0.547716 1.20047***
s14 -29.5375*** 2.39828** 0.769967 -3.97266*** 11.0924** -4.04466 2.12435 11.5218*** 4.55721*** 1.34639
s15 -33.6333*** -2.30107 3.13574** 1.30987 -7.51757 -10.4377*** -0.944361 3.28488*** 1.07419
s16 -830.953*** -4.84189** 332.308*** 38.694** 112.796** -27.4988 -1.29867 -0.123169
s17 -15.1824*** -0.332184 -5.98247 0.019376 -1.55166 -4.76606*** 0.069679
s18 -465.275*** 6.09492 31.7057 -34.9861 -8.55105** -1.7151
s19 -138.193*** -32.3953** -3.86465 -2.54874 -25.5576***
s20 -1757.14*** -0.060968 3.32879 5.57103**
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The own and cross price elasticities taken across both stages of the model  tend to be 
highly elastic. This is true for both the fresh products and the frozen ones. Many of the 
cross price elasticities are significant . For example, looking at the fresh breast meat 
commodity only at the second stage PBFC, BNC, UFCB, WNGS, SC, PART are 
substitutes and BUGU, burg, wingt, and drumt are complements. Isolating breast meat as 
a single category provides some illumination on the degree of substitutability. There are a 
greater number of statistically significant interactions between fresh breast meat and 
other commodity groups than between any other individual product and the rest. It 
appears that except for whole birds where the relationship is not statistically significant 
all of the other commodity groups are substitutes for fresh breast meat.  
The expenditure elasticity measures by what percentage quantity demanded 
changes for a 1% increase in expenditure on a particular commodity group. Table 16 
gives the expenditure elasticities across both stages of the estimated model. All of the 
expenditure elasticities across both stages have the expected positive sign except for fresh 
winglettes. If the expenditure elasticity is >1 then the goods in question are luxuries and 
if it is <1 then the good is a necessity. Most of the expenditure elasticities are significant 
at the 10% level or better indicating that the amount people have to spend on chicken 
influences how much they purchase. Since many of the frozen items are white meat and 
further processed they were expected to be luxuries with elasticities >1. PBFC, BNC, 
UFCB, PART, whole, drums, legs, thigh have expenditure elasticities >1. . Much of the 
product development has occurred in the frozen and further processed subgroups. 
Characterized by high turnover frozen chicken contains many experimental goods and 
companies try to see which products will catch on with consumers, examples would 
include products like “dinosaur shaped breaded chicken.” Therefore, since many of the  
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items are new consumers perhaps have not tried them or even know that they exist so the 
expenditure elasticities are smaller, not reflecting luxury goods. Whole birds also appear 
to be a luxury good with an expenditure elasticity of 1.84 implying that if a consumers 
expenditure increases by 1%, expenditure on whole birds goes up by more than 1%. 
Breast meat is expenditure inelastic so many consumers may already view it as a 
necessity perhaps because of health aspects.  
  Substitution elasticities are also calculated for the commodity groups. Table 17 
gives the substitution elasticities.  The substitution elasticity measures the percent change 
in the ratio of good y to x purchased in response to a percentage change in the price ratio 
(Binger and Hoffman, 1998). All of the own substitution elasticities are negative as 
expected. The cross substitution elasticities are also given but to be consistent only breast 
meat will be examined in detail, all other commodity groups can be analyzed in the same 
fashion. Most of the elasticities are significant and since none that are significant are 
negative it indicates people are willing to substitute towards breast meat if the price of 
other chicken products goes up. This is particularly true for other white meat products. 
For example if the price of frozen unflavored chicken breast were to increase by 1% 
consumers would substitute towards fresh breast meat by 6.1%. If the price of dark meat 
products such as thighs or drums increases people are much less willing to substitute to 
breast meat. This could be because dark meat is priced much lower compared to white 
meat and a large price increase would be needed before people would be encouraged to 
switch. This indicates that the substitutability of the two meat types is not very high. Or 
there could be different types of consumers in the market with strict preferences for either  
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white or dark meat. People with strong preferences for one of the meat types are not 
willing to substitute easily. The smaller the substitution elasticity the less opportunity for 
trade off that exists and the two meats may be more like complements rather than 
substitutes. Another interesting commodity group is whole birds since it contains both 
types of meat. Overall the substitution elasticities are greater then one for every 
significant elasticity. Even for dark meat products like thighs and drums consumers are 
willing to switch to whole birds if individual product prices increase. With respect to 
white meat products on the frozen side which are less marinated, they are more 
substitutable with whole birds probably because they produce an un-marinated and un-
seasoned breast just like the whole bird has. 
Market Simulation Model  
Even though the results just presented can provide a great deal of economic 
information more can be done with them. The parameters of the estimation can be used to 
construct market simulation experiments that can assist the industry in developing a 
marketing strategy by improving the quality of information in the system.  A model can 
be developed that is focused on the domestic market with different chicken products 
supplied and demanded and includes the farm, processing, and retail sectors. The model 
can be used to illustrate how the farm supply, producer surplus, processor revenue and 
the domestic quantities are affected by a change in the pricing strategy for different types 
of chicken products. The simulation model can be used to discover the dynamic 
relationships that exist between white and dark meat.  
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 In developing the model and given the conformation of chicken it is necessary to 
develop some proportional yields for each of the 23 products in the model. The assorted 
(ast) category serves an important role with respect to live chickens slaughtered. Since 
the product is not defined the residual between the yields of each of the other 22 products 
and the total eviscerated weight of chicken can be ascribed to the assorted category. All 
of the yields of each product are derived from a whole eviscerated chicken. Since many 
of the frozen products are white meat their proportion is subtracted from the breast meat 
category and other dark meat products like burgers are derived from either, legs, or the 
assorted category of fresh dark meat. 
The synthetic simulation model contains a wide array of data from 2001 to be able 
to reproduce a static representation of the market at a particular point in time. Data on 
retail quantities, retail price, farm supply and live birds, farm marginal cost, and quota 
value as well as processor supply and export levels are given, providing  starting values 
for the simulation (1). Since the chicken industry is supply managed, in 2001 farmers 
received a negotiated price for each bird in this case $1.45/kg live. The farm price is 
made up of two components; the first is marginal cost which is subject to supply 
conditions. The other component is the average static quota value which makes up the 
difference between marginal cost and the regulated farm price,  processors pay the 
regulated farm price. Farm marginal cost and farm supply of live birds were obtained 
from the CFC (2002). Retail prices come from the A C Nielsen© data. For the sake of the 
model simulation it is assumed that every bird slaughtered yields 1.53 kg of eviscerated 
meat (CFC Chicken Data Handbook, 2002).   
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  There are two main market levels illustrated in the model, the first is the 
processor level and the other is the retail level. Market levels are linked together since 
Retail Demand equals Processor Supply for a particular product and Processor Demand 
for Live Birds equals Farm Supply for live birds.  Farm supply and processor demand 
elasticities are taken from Fulton and Tang’s (1999) analysis of the Canadian chicken 
industry to calibrate the processor demand and farm supply equations. Retail prices for 
individual products are linked to the farm price and to the volume of product flowing for 
each individual product. The quantity elasticities for each price linkage equation are 
identified below in Table 18. Chicken burgers, winglettes and nuggets did not have 
quantity coefficients that were statistically significantly different from zero 
Table 18: Retail Price Linkage Equation Quantity Elasticities (t statistics in 
parentheses) 
 
Product Quantity  Elasticity
Premium breaded formed chicken  -.12 (-8.38) 
Value priced breaded formed chicken -.07 (-2.74) 
Frozen breaded natural chicken  -.03 (-1.28) 
Frozen flavoured chicken breast  -.19 (-4.83) 
Frozen chicken breasts  -.08 (-6.19) 
Frozen wings  -.09 (-2.99) 
Stuffed Chicken  -.13 (-1.75) 
Frozen chicken burgers  0 
Frozen breaded chicken burgers  -.05 (-1.99) 
Frozen chicken parts  -.04 (-1.86) 
All other frozen chicken  -.11 (-3.46) 
Fresh whole chicken  -.35 (-12.14) 
Fresh chicken breast  -.18 (-4.37) 
Drumsticks -.23  (-6.22) 
Chicken wings  -.35 (-5.67) 
Chicken burger  -.18 (-4.70) 
Chicken legs  -.12 (-3.12) 
Chicken winglettes  0 
Chicken drumettes  -.03 (-1.98) 
Chicken kabobs  -.56 (-7.40)  
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Chicken nuggets  0 
Chicken thighs  -.25 (-7.04) 
Assorted chicken   -.14 (-1.97) 
 
Producer surplus, the economic returns above variable costs of production is 
identified as a measure of producer welfare, from farm level production and farm price. 
Initially the base model has producer surplus identified at $518,971,000. The two 
illustrative simulations of ‘what might have happened if’ to the synthetic model of 2001 
Canadian chicken market are : 
1.  – what might have happened if the price of beef had dropped (an 
attempt to illustrate the impact of the May 2003 BSE impact on 
the market ) and  
2.  – what might have happened if all exports to other countries 
were suddenly constrained to zero 
All simulation results are presented as the percent change from the base case and 
as such can be negative to illustrate a reduction in that variable or positive to show an 
increase. The simulation is deterministic and does not take into account any error that 
might be in the parameters or variables. The simulation results can be examined under a 
number of different scenarios depending upon the policy responses from industry. Purely 
as an illustration of what could happen the two simulations presented below assume that 
farm price and farm supply remain at their actual levels. This means that neither of these 
assumed ‘shocks’ to the system could have an impact on farm level profits. The shocks 
will impact on quantities consumed of various products, retail prices, distribution of 
product from export to domestic market. Results of the one year simulation are given in  
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Table 19.  The main variables that will be examined are, quantity on the domestic retail 
market (Qui), retail price (Pi), processor revenue (PRV) and total expenditure by 
consumers on chicken (TEXP) .  
Table 19: Synthetic Model Simulation Results 
Variable Base  Simulation  with 
Lower Beef Prices 
Base Simulation  with 
Exports = 0 
Consumer Expenditure 
000$ 




407323 371090  209893 273564   
Processor Revenue 
000$ 
$1138210 $1054930 $362930  $306729   
Premium breaded 
formed chicken- qty 
17003 15597  9080  9080   
Value priced breaded 
formed chicken-qty 
2541 2426  1745 1745 
Frozen breaded natural 
chicken-qty 
3708 3431  2160 2160 
Frozen flavoured 
chicken breast-qty 
1258 1232  1034 1034 
Frozen chicken breasts-
qty 
6603 5949  4250 4250 
Frozen  wings-qty  5076 5566  6327 6327 
Stuffed Chicken-qty  1547  1434  803  803 
Frozen chicken 
burgers-qty 
1563 1519  1204 1204 
Frozen breaded 
chicken burgers-qty 
2168 2126  1872 1872 
Frozen chicken parts-
qty 
466 427  249 249 
All other frozen 
chicken-qty 
2520 2563  255  255  
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Fresh whole chicken-
qty 
164380 139970  43916  43916 
Fresh chicken breast-
qty 
61049 60451  49168 49173 
Drumsticks-qty  30202 27894  16747 16747 
Chicken wings-qty  11540  11426  8350  11392 
Chicken  burger-qty  176 179  160 160 
Chicken  legs-qty  57616 52563  29274 77535 
Chicken  winglettes-qty  311 336  359 359 
Chicken  drumettes-qty  288 408  851 851 
Chicken  kabobs-qty  283 260  113 113 
Chicken  nuggets-qty  1385 1421  1221 1221 
Chicken  thighs-qty  26863 25283  16486 16486 
Assorted chicken-qty   8767  8622  11967  24330 
Premium breaded 
formed chicken-price 
$6.81 $6.88  $6.81 $7.34 
Value priced breaded 
formed chicken-price 
$3.77 $3.78  =  $3.88 
Frozen breaded natural 
chicken-price 
$10.42 $10.45  =  $10.59 
Frozen flavoured 
chicken breast-price 
$10.90 $10.95  =  $11.32 
Frozen chicken breasts-
price 
$8.66 $8.73  =  $8.97 
Frozen wings-price  $9.77  $9.69  =  $9.58 
Stuffed Chicken-price  $10.61  $10.71  =  $11.56 
Frozen chicken 
burgers-price 
$4.86 $4.86  =  $4.93 
Frozen breaded 
chicken burgers-price 
$6.96 $6.97  =  $7.01 
Frozen chicken parts-
price 
$8.19 $8.22  =  $8.40  
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All other frozen 
chicken-price 
$5.85 $5.83  =  $5.83 
Fresh whole chicken-
price 
$2.71 $2.87  =  $4.30 
Fresh chicken breast-
price 
$9.20 $9.22  =  $9.56 
Drumsticks-price $3.09  $3.15  =  $3.54 
Chicken wings-price  $5.08  $5.10  $5.69        $5.10 
Chicken burger-price  $4.69  $4.67  =  $4.77 
Chicken  legs-price  $2.16 $2.18  $2.33 $2.08 
Chicken winglettes-
price 
$4.75 $4.74  =  $4.73 
Chicken drumettes-
price 
$8.85 $8.75  =  $8.56 
Chicken kabobs-price  $3.99  $4.19  =  $6.69 
Chicken nuggets-price  $6.93  $6.89  =  $7.15 
Chicken thighs-price  $4.17  $4.24  =  $4.72 
Assorted chicken-price   $5.34  $5.35  $5.11  $4.63 
 
The results presented above are from two different types of simulation. In the first 
case, the model simulates with fixed flows of product to export and food service markets, 
all adjustment is felt in the retail domestic market and distributed across all individual 
goods. The first two columns in the above table highlight the effect of lower beef prices 
across the chicken products consumed. Total consumer expenditure, total quantity of 
chicken consumed and processor revenue all decline in this scenario, however some 
chicken products consumption increases while others decrease (farm profit/producer 
surplus, supply and price are unaffected as they are held constant in this scenario). In the  
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second simulation different variables are held exogenous, the products that have 
previously had exports are constrained to zero and those products are forced back onto 
the domestic market, affecting quantities of previously traded products (+), overall 
expenditure (+), processor revenue (-), total quantity consumed (+) .  That this simulation 
produces different results is highlighted by the difference in the base values for total 
consumption, so the scenarios are not comparable across simulations, only comparable to 
the base in each case. The highly non-linear nature of the model under different sets of 
variables produces the variability in base quantities,  Monte Carlo simulation including 
error terms back into the models could produce standard errors around these simulation 
results, although that exercise has not been completed yet. What is clear from the 
simulations however is that product substitutions are important to the outcomes of 
exogenous price or trade shocks in terms of aggregate levels of consumption, producer 
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MARKET STRUCTURE AND RETURNS TO ADVERTISING 
AND RESEARCH
4 
In the Canadian chicken market, and various other markets throughout the world, 
increasing concentration in processing and retailing is becoming a noticeable trend.   
Additionally, in these markets there is a growing interest in the balance between branded, 
private label and generic products.  As part of a sustainable profit maximization plan, 
various processors must determine optimal strategies around selling branded products 
(where they carry the cost of product development and branding), versus selling ‘generic’ 
product to grocery stores.  Different grocery chains may have different strategies they 
pursue for their store shelves, which may involve maintaining a balance between generic, 
branded, and their own private label products.  Processors of significantly different sizes 
sell to grocery store chains that are national in scope, in an industry with very thin 
margins.  In economic nomenclature, these marketing strategies can be considered 
‘games’ played by the various market participants.  The interactions and strategic 
planning of processors and retailers are becoming industry defining characteristics, not 
only affecting processors and retailers but also producers and consumers.  Ultimately, the 
actions of the processors and retailers have an increasing influence on societal welfare.  
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies, Alemson (1970), Spington and 
Wernerfelt (1985), Quirmbach (1993) and Symeonidis (2003) to mention a few, illustrate 
that producer groups, processors/manufacturers, and retailers wishing to maximize 
returns, can invest in strategies such as research, promotion, and product development.  
Governments can make public investments in the same.  The literature suggests that 
imperfect competition has an impact on the size and distribution of returns to these 
private and public investments.  Cotterill (2000) has shown that the types of games being 
played, not just the existence of imperfect competition, can impact the distribution of 
benefits/losses through the marketing chain.  Further investigation of the structure of the 
games is necessary if producer groups are to make sensible investment decisions. 
                                                 
4 Much of this final section of the report is taken directly from an unpublished Masters thesis by Ben 
Shank, 2004.  
 65  
Increasing concentration and possibly market power exploitation mark the 
Canadian industry.  Cotterill (2000) and Dhar and Cotterill (2002) describe a similar US 
market as a “tight oligopoly in successive stages of a market channel.”  This description 
deviates from the conventional assumptions of competitive firms and single stage 
marketing channels to include a more disaggregated model, a two stage industry market 
channel, and explicit models of retailer and processor actions with the possibility of non-
competitive behavior.  The deviation away from competitive markets with a small 
number of firms are often classified as models of noncooperative oligopoly (Carlton and 
Perloff, 2000).  In such a model, oligopolists cannot ignore the actions of other firms.  In 
the extremes, a monopoly firm has no rivals, while individual competitive firms are too 
small to affect the industry’s price; therefore each firm reasonably ignores the actions of 
any other firm.  Thus, only the industries’ collective actions matter.  Differing from   
monopoly and perfect competition, an oligopolistic firm realizes that the actions of other 
firms affect its own best policy.   
 
  The initial objective of this part of the research project is to empirically examine 
the market structure of the Canadian chicken market.  This objective includes modeling 
demand and processor strategic conduct for individual products competing in an 
oligopoly market.  The estimated model can be used to analyze the size and distribution 
of benefits from producer investments in advertising and research under an appropriate 
characterization of the existing market structure. The research will expand upon the 
previous research of Cotterill (2000), Dhar and Cotterill (2002), maintaining 
noncompetitive, differentiated product, dual stage market channel assumptions  but also 
including brand and generic product advertising and farm supply effects.  While previous 
agricultural commodity research has addressed advertising effects under different 
assumptions about competitive structure, none have used a non-cooperative, dual stage 
marketing channel with explicit game structures.  Much of the marketing channel 
research has focused on the cost past through rates with constant (farm level) marginal 
costs.  The addition of farm level positively sloped supply equations rather than constant 
marginal costs will be explored.    The potential implications for market participants  
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(including farmers) from changes in advertising expenditure will be examined using the 
noncompetitive differentiated product, dual stage market channel assumptions. 
Related Literature 
Although there is an abundance of literature on the economic impacts of generic 
advertising and there is an understanding of the link between producer returns and market 
structure, the literature on returns to generic advertising under imperfect competition is 
not that voluminous. A summary of some of the relevant literature in this area is provided 
in Table 20 
 
Table 20: Studies Examining Generic Advertising under Imperfect Competition 
Study and Year  Analysis  Conclusion  









 for the cases of 
oligopoly, oligopsony and 
oligopoly/oligopsony 
As compared to competitive markets: 
Optimal advertising intensity lower under 
oligopoly, unless the advertising makes demand 
more elastic and reduces the distortion from 
oligopoly power. 
Optimal advertising intensity always lower under 
oligopsony or oligopoly/oligopsony power 
Zhang, Sexton and 
Alston (2002) 
Brand advertising 
and farmer welfare 
General model 
formulation, simulation 
Brand advertising can: 
Increase demand for farm products or 
Increase market power of the advertising firm, 
leading to reduced farm sales 
Depken, Kamerschen 
and Snow (2002) 
Generic advertising 
of intermediate 
goods: theory and 




dairy model example 
Generic advertising can arise voluntarily, positive 
contributions will be linked to high advertising 
elasticities, lower price elasticities and larger firm 
size. The problems of free riders can be handled 




Distribution of gains 
from research and 
promotion in the 




For the case of oligopoly 
power 
Results suggest a more important role for 
processor input substitutability than for market 
power in affecting level and distributional effects 
of promotion and research 









Generic advertising can be socially beneficial in 
the case where competitive farm industry 
competes with a monopoly/monopsony 
downstream distributor. Generic advertising 
would lead to an increase in the monopolist’s 
output  
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All of the above studies are essentially exploratory in nature and provide us with 
meaningful insights as to expected reactions to generic advertising under different market 
structures. The suggestion that market power has the potential to increase producer 
surplus response to generic advertising is particularly important. While it is clear that 
prices, quantities and revenues/profits are higher for primary producers in competitive 
markets than in markets where they face monopoly/oligopoly and/or 
monopsony/oligopsony market power, the returns to advertising can potentially be higher 
under the market power scenario. To illustrate this finding, reported above by Zhang and 
Sexton, a simple example can be used. 
It is possible to construct a simple synthetic model of a marketing channel with 
one product produced at farm level, transformed by processors and retailers, and sold at 
retail level to final consumers. The exact marketing relationships will vary depending 
upon the market structure, as illustrated in Table 21. 
Table 21: Different Market Structure Hypotheses with homogeneous product  
  produced and consumed 
Market Structure: 
Competition 
Market Structure: Oligopoly  Market Structure: Monopoly 
Assume a commodity 
market with fixed 
proportion processing 
technology, producers pay 
for generic advertising 
•  Retail Demand  
     Q=a - b*P-c/ADV 
•  Processor 
Demand  
     Q=f + d*P-e*PF 
•  Farm Supply  
     Q=g + h*PF 





Assume a commodity market with 
fixed proportion processing 
technology, producers pay for 
generic advertising and 
processor/retailer oligopoly market 
power exists: 
•  Retail Demand  
     Q=a-b*P-c/ADV 
•  Processor Demand  
     Q=f + d*P-e*PF 
•  Retail Price  
      P=PF/(1-θ/(η))  
     (θ=conjecture, 
     η=elasticity) 
•  Farm Supply  
     Q=g + h*PF 
•  Producer Surplus  
     PS=PF*Q-((.5/h)*Q**2- 
    g/h*Q)-ADV 
 
Assume a commodity market with 
fixed proportion processing 
technology, producers pay for generic 
advertising and processor/retailer 
monopoly market power exists: 
•  Retail Demand  
     Q=a-b*P-c/ADV 
•  Processor Demand  
     Q=f + d*MR-e*PF 
•  Marginal Revenue 
      MR= -a/b + c/(b*ADV) + 
2/b*Q   
•  Farm Supply  
     Q=g + h*PF 
•  Producer Surplus  
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Although it is quite clear even from the above that the producer surplus will get 
progressively lower as you move from left to right, the real question of what happens 
when you increase advertising expenditure is not so clear. With some example numbers 
the following empirical results are illustrative. 
 
Table 22: Example Results from Increasing Advertising Expenditure with the base 
for each structure calibrated to produce the same price and quantity 











Retail Price  $6.85  $7.71  $7.70  $7.63 
Farm Price  $5.00  $5.31  $5.32  $5.36 
Quantity 320  350  350.4  354 
Processor 
Profit 
$592 $838  (41.5%) $835  (41%) $806  (36%) 
Producer 
Surplus 
$473 $513  (9.4%) $519  (9.7%) $534  (12.8%) 
 
Since the increased advertising makes the demand ‘more elastic’ (certain with 
linear functional forms) the ‘distortion from market power is reduced’ and the actual 
benefit (return per dollar invested in advertising) to producers is higher under monopoly 
conditions than under competitive market conditions. The question of whether or not 
processors/retailers also benefit from the generic advertising is interesting but not critical 
to the measurement of producer benefit; it provides a clue as to whether or not the 
advertising could partially be funded by processors and/or retailers, an innovation which 
could increase producer benefit more. If producer returns to advertising are affected by 
market structure; does it also matter what type of games result in the oligopoly market 
power? In the above conjectural elasticity example the type of market power does not 
change when advertising changes. The question of whether the outcome from different 
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Modelling Vertical Structure 
The study of competitive interaction in market channels which are vertical in 
nature, i.e. producer to processor, processor to retailer, retailer to consumer, has evolved 
considerably in the marketing literature.  Early agricultural economics studies 
concentrated on homogeneous products and models that assumed that the market channel 
was a single industry with competitive firms (Gardener, 1975; Heien, 1980; Kinnucan 
and Forker, 1987).  McCorriston, Morgan, and Rayner (1998) maintain the assumptions 
of a homogeneous product and a single stage industry but relax the competitive industry 
assumption, much like the example above.  It is not until one examines the marketing 
literature that one finds more sophisticated assumptions regarding the actual structure of 
the marketing channel with products distinguished by brand/product attribute. Recent 
marketing studies have explored conjectural variation, non-cooperative game theory 
models under Nash equilibrium (for example, Lal, 1990; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal, 
1990).  Two notable studies by the University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural 
Resource Economics, Food Marketing Policy Center are of interest.  In these articles 
Cotterill (2000) and Dhar and Cotterill (2002) it is recognized that agricultural markets 
are often successive stage oligopolies.  These research studies, as well as ones by Liang 
(1987) and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1996) use menu approaches to model 
non-competitive, differentiated product, dual or single stage market channels. The 
possibility of differentiating even a homogeneous farm product into different brands and 
examining the determination of various brand retail prices is potentially of some 
importance since there are many trends to either brand generic products (companies 
branding fresh meat products) or to move already branded products back to simpler lines,  
predominantly using generic and private label products (recent movements in eggs and 
milk in Australia). The one way in which these brand level demand models do not match 
up with the earlier agricultural economics literature is through the simple assumptions 
made regarding marginal costs faced by processors or retailers. In some empirical 
examples in the literature the implied marginal cost is derived as an econometric 
parameter, rather than included as an explanatory variable. In other it is assumed to be  
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fixed, making the models inapplicable to determining the producer benefits of generic 
advertising. 
Following Cotterill (2000) it is possible to identify a market structure based on 
some limiting assumptions: 
  Horizontal competition both at processing and retail level is Nash in prices 
  Vertical nature of competition between processors and retailers is captured 
  by     
1. a two stage vertical Nash model where each retailer chooses an exclusive 
  processor and processors and retailers maximize profit simultaneously by 
  determining wholesale and retail price 
2. a two stage vertical Stackelberg game where in the first stage processors 
  maximize profit by determining the retail price based on a reaction function of the 
  retailer and in the second stage retailers maximize profit given a wholesale price. 
  Dyadic relationships, each retailer deals only with one processor . 
For that model the demand functions of retailers can be defined as : 
 q 1 = a0 + a1 p1 +a2 p2 
 q 2 = b0 + b1 p1 + b2 p2 
The retailer’s cost function can be defined as : 
 TC1 = w1*q1 
 TC2 = w2*q2 
The retailer’s profit function can thus be defined as: 
  Π1
R = (p1-w1)q1 
Π2
R = (p2-w2)q2 
In the Vertical Nash game a linear mark-up at retail is conjectured by the processor on 
retail price so retail price can be assumed by the processor to be: 
 p 1 = w1 + r1 
 p 2 = w2+ r2  where r1 and r2 are the linear mark-ups for each retailer. 
In the Vertical Stackelberg game, each processor develops a conjecture from the first 
order condition of the retailer so retail price can be assumed by the processor to be:  
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 p 1= ½ w1 – 1/2a1 (a0-a2p2) 
 p 2= ½ w2 – 1/2b2 (b0-b1p1) 
The processor marginal cost curves can be expressed as : 
  wmc1 = m + m1 
  wmc2 = m + m2 where m is the industry specific marginal cost ( farm price) and 
m1 and m2 are processor specific cost components. 
Given those costs the processor profit functions can be written as: 
  Π1
P = (w1-m-m1) q1 
  Π2
P = (w2-m-m2) q2. 
The solution of the set of simultaneous equations, under the two hypothesized market 
structures, results in ‘cost-pass-through’ rates that are the same regardless of the structure 
of the game. This is illustrated in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 23: Cost Pass Through Rates, fixed farm prices, two different structural 
games 
 
Cost Pass Through Rates  Vertical Nash  Vertical 
Stackelberg 
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The addition of farm supply to the above model significantly increases the complexity of 
the various cost pass through rates. The farm supply equation selected could be of the 
following form: 
 
  m= pf = g + h ( q1+ q2). 
To illustrate the impact of farm supply on the cost pass through rates the following 
examples of one rate can be expressed: 
 




 It is worth noting that with the addition of farm supply the cost pass through rates for the 
two market structures become different. 
 
It is also possible to illustrate the impact of advertising on the structural model, in the 
first instance assuming no farm supply. With the addition of advertising the following 
demand equations can be assumed: 
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Farm supply : Farm Price = g + h 
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3 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 0 2
3 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 1
/ /
/ /
adv x adv b p b p b b q
adv x adv p p q
+ + + + =
+ + + + = α α α α
 
Three different advertising variables are assumed, adv1 which is brand advertising for 
product 1, adv 2  which is brand advertising for product 2 and adv3 which is generic 
advertising affecting the demands for both goods. 
 
Under the two different market structures the following example cost pass through rates 
can be expressed: 
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From the above it is clear with fixed marginal costs the impact of a change in advertising 
expenditure on retail price is the same regardless of which game is being played 
vertically between processors and retailers. However from the above two examples it is 
clear that the addition of endogenous farm supply would make the impact of the two 
advertising variables different. 
 
Modelling games between two processors and retailers with generic and branded 
products 
It is possible to illustrate a somewhat more realistic market scenarios if one allows for the 
existence of both generic and branded products. For illustrative purposes another market 
scenario can be constructed assuming that the two retailers each sell some branded and 
some generic product. Each processor produces some branded and some generic product, 
each retailer still has a dyadic relationship with only one processor. The last simplifying 
assumption is that  the generic product is sold at the same price by each processor and  
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retailer.  This scenario requires the addition of a third product demand relationship and 
the determination of the share of generic product sold by each retailer and processor (s1). 
 
The demand equations can be expressed as: 
 
3 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 0 3
2 4 3 3 2 2 1 2 0 2
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where product 1 and 2 are the branded products and product 3 is the generic product sold 















However the profit equations for each retailer are a function of their sales of the one 
branded product ( either 1 or 2) and their share (s1 or 1-s1) of the generic product (3). The 
two profit functions can be expressed as: 
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These costs associated with each product lead to the following profit functions for each 
processor, again related to the sales of their branded product and their share of the generic 
product sold: 
()
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Following the earlier structure the processors conjectures can either be of the Nash type 
expressed below:  











or of the Stackelberg type where the y are a function of the retailer’s first order condition 
with respect to each price. In a world where each retailer could charge a different price 
for the generic product the Stackelberg processor price conjectures would be as below: 
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In the simulation illustrated here the generic product demand is priced at the same level 
regardless of which retailer sells the product. With or without the addition of farm supply 
the complexities of the above model structure make it difficult to illustrate algebraically 
the impact of advertising on retail and wholesale prices (and farm price in the case of 
endogenous farm supply).  
  To use the model as an illustrative tool various price, advertising and supply 
elasticities are assumed. The own and cross price elasticities are as expressed in the table 
below 
Table 26: Assumed Own and Cross Price and Advertising Elasticities 
  P1  P2  P3  ADV 
Q1  -2  .5  .25  .25 
Q2    -1.5  .251  .25 
Q3      -1.75  .25 
 
The assumed supply elasticity is 1.0. The model is run with and without fixed marginal 
costs ( fixed farm price). The results in terms of aggregate quantity sold and farm price, 
with producer surplus retailer and processor profit are expressed below.  
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Table 27: Simulation Results from doubling Generic Advertising Expenditure with 
Fixed Marginal Cost 
Model  Vertical Nash Vertical Stackelberg
Farm Price  5 5 
Quantity change  3.32 (2.5%)  3.13 (2.6%) 
Producer Surplus  change  -6.51 (-2.9%)  -6.47 (-2.9%) 
Retailer 1 π  change  5.29 (4.1%)  4.75 (4.7%) 
Retailer 2 π  change  5.97(4.4%) 5.72  (5.0%) 
Processor 1 π  change  10.17 (4.4%)  10.4 (4.4%) 
Processor 2 π  change  12.25 (4.7%)  12.25 (4.7%) 
 
The results suggest a decline in producer surplus with the additional generic advertising; 
something that is sensible given that farm price does not change and producers must fund 
the additional advertising expenditure. The generic advertising expenditure increase 
affects all quantities sold in the market slightly. The processors and retailers each benefit 
from the increased generic advertising and sales of all three products increase, product 3 
sales increase the most. 
The results from the model simulation with endogenous farm supply are more useful and 
are summarized below. 
Table 28:  Simulation Results from doubling Generic Advertising  Expenditure with 
Variable  Marginal Cost 
Model  Vertical Nash Vertical Stackelberg
Farm Price change  .033 (1.5%)  .036 (1.3%) 
Quantity change  2.11 (1.4%)  2.37 (1.6%) 
Producer Surplus change  4.67 (3.0%)  5.35 (3.2%) 
Retailer 1 π  change  2.42 (1.6%)  3.7 (2.4%) 
Retailer 2 π  change  3.27(2.0%) 3.72  (2.9%) 
Processor 1 π  change  10.83 (2.6%)  10.93 (2.5%) 
Processor 2 π  change  13.38 (3.2%)  13.21 (3.1%) 
 
With the endogenous farm supply the results again suggest an increase in quantity sold, 
with an attendant increase in farm supply and price. The impact on quantity and price are 
somewhat larger with the Stackelberg structure than with the Nash structure. The increase 
in farm supply and price results in a positive impact on producer surplus, greater than the 
cost of the additional advertising expenditure. Retailers and processors both benefit from 
the additional generic advertising.   
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Returns to Research and Development 
In addition to investing in advertising, many agricultural markets have sought to 
generate further returns through investments in research and development (R&D).  While 
there is much controversy about the actual effectiveness and returns to R&D programs, 
this section investigates the theoretical reasoning behind its use. 
  Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) illustrate two different approaches for 
analyzing the effects for R&D.  The first accounts for firm level changes in production as 
a result of R&D, while the second examines industry supply changes as an aggregated 
account of firm level production choices.  In the production approach research induced 
benefits derived from changes in knowledge may include more output for a given level of 
input, cost savings for a given quantity of input, new and better products, better 
organization and quicker responsiveness to changing circumstances.  These benefits as 
derived from investments in R&D are a result of improvements in the production process.  
Algebraically, Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) illustrate agricultural production in time 
t, Qt, as a function of conventional inputs, Xt, various infrastructure variables such as 
roads, communication services, irrigation and education, Zt, uncontrolled factors such as 
weather, Wt, and the flow of services, Ft, derived from changes in the stock of 
knowledge, Kt, and the adoption rate knowledge . 
  ( ) t t t t F W Z X q Qt , , , =  (2.19) 
In this production function, investments in research can lead to changes in productivity 
via changes in conventional input quality or price, increases in the stock of knowledge, or 
by increasing the adoption/utilization of the current stock of knowledge.  From a firm 
perspective, improvements in the production process which require less commitment of 
resources are seen as positive benefits to R&D. 
  In the second approach, the supply approach, improvements in production alter 
the relationship between inputs and outputs resulting in a technical change.  The change 
in technology affects the relationship between production costs and output thus between 
supply and price.  Therefore, investments in R&D allow for better firm level production  
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processes, which from a supply analysis, create a technological change and shift the 
market supply curve outward.  The benefits of supply increases are often controversial 
and largely depend on the elasticity of both supply and demand.  As demand becomes 
inelastic consumers primarily benefit while producers see little return and often may be 
made worse off.  As supply becomes inelastic, producers will see greater returns for R&D 
investment (Oemke and Crawford, 2002).  Alston et al (2000) present historical evidence 
to help reduce some of the uncertainty regarding returns to R&D.  In their study, they 
query 289 previous agricultural studies and confirm a mean rate of return of 65%.  In the 
agricultural sector returns to R&D are generally positive. In a manner similar to the 
previous exposition about returns to advertising models can be specified which examine 
the returns to research in the context of imperfectly competitive market structures where  
processors and retailers are pa-laying pricing games within a vertical market channel.  
The Model 
The objective of previous research has often been to model 
processor/manufacturer action in a fully structural model.  In such models, both retail and 
wholesale prices are endogenously determined.  In this research, the utilization of a fully 
structural system is limited by provision of solely retail level data.  Given this restriction, 
and using an approach similar to Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta (1996) is 
employed to extract processor conduct from the role of the retailer. 
Think of the following sequence of moves being played in the market 
(repeatedly): the processors price their product(s) to the retailers and advertise, taking 
into account rival pricing policies and advertising behavior, as well as retailer behavior.  
While advertising by processors is usually assumed for branded products only, processors 
may engage in generic advertising if speculated returns warrant investment. Retailers 
then determine the retail price and private label advertising. When processors take these 
rules as given, the interaction between processors and retailers is assumed to be Nash: 
processors choose their wholesale prices and advertising investment as a response to 
retailer advertising.  An important assumption is that retailers do not compete 
horizontally within a particular product category.  This assumption, when considering  
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producer-retailer Nash interaction, is similar to assuming fixed markup pricing rule in 
setting retail prices.  Should retailers strategically set retail prices and advertising, both 
retail and wholesale prices would be required for empirical estimation. 
To begin, a generalized Bertrand-Nash game is illustrated, followed by the 
development of a generalized Stackelberg game. The demand facing each firm is 





ij i i X
CPI
p
q + + = ∑
=1
γ α  (3.1) 
where i =1…n, j =1…n, n equals the number of processors being considered, qi,and pi  
represent the quantity and price of processor i,  αi, and γij represent demand parameters to 
be estimated and  i X   represents a vector other exogenous variables and parameters used 
for empirical estimation.  Using economic theory, non-sample information is used to 
impose homogeneity of degree zero in prices and symmetry (i.e γij = γji). Homogeneity of 
degree zero is imposed by dividing each price by the consumer price index (CPI).  
  Processor profit functions can be illustrated as 
  ( ) i i i i q mc p − = π  (3.2) 
where πi and mc represent profit and marginal cost of manufacturing for processor i.  In 
this profit function, the use of marginal cost rather than average cost assumes that fixed 
costs make up an insignificant portion of the final good’s cost.  Therefore marginal cost is 
assumed to be an accurate approximation of a good’s average cost.  Previous research 
supporting this approach include Liang (1987), Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta 
(1999), Cotterill (2000),  Dhar and Cotterill (2002), and Kinoshinta, Suzuki, and Kaiser 
(2002),  
Bertrand-Nash Game 
In the Bertrand-Nash game each processor develops a marketing strategy by 
optimizing their own price with respect to their profit function. This type of competition  
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models direct horizontal price competition between processors.  The derivation of the 
first order condition (FOC), as required for a maxima, follows as such, 
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Substituting the previous two partial derivatives and demand equation (3.1) into equation 
(3.2) we get  
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Combining demand equations and price reaction functions, the following system of 
equations exists for empirical estimation. 
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 (3.6  b) 
The errors (ε1… ε n+i) are econometric estimation errors that result when missing 
data or uncertainty is encountered.  As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the 
interrelatedness of these errors warrant the use of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), 
rather than individual estimation of the above equations. 
Stackelberg Game 
In a price leadership or Stackelberg game, one processor (processor k, where k 
=1…n, and  k ≠ i) is chosen as the leader and all other firms follow.  The leader develops  
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a marketing strategy accounting for the optimal marketing decision of the followers.  The 
choice of an initial leader is not important, as long as each processor is given the 
opportunity to lead.  Because, initially, the true model is unknown, estimation of various 
possibilities is important because it “lets the data speak” and helps avoid researcher 
estimation bias (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1996). In this example the 
followers’ FOCs and simplified reactions are, 
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 (3.7  b) 
 where  i =1…n, excluding i = k. 
In the following four steps, the leader’s price reaction function is developed by 
substituting the followers’ reaction functions into the leader’s maximand.  First, the 
leaders profit function is defined. 
  k k k q mc p ) ( − = π    (3.8) 
Second, the demand equation for the leader’s product is substituted into the profit 
function. 

















γ α π  (3.9) 
Third, the leader forms a conjecture about the followers conduct, substituting the 
followers’ price reaction functions from equations (3.7 b) into its own profit function to 
replace all pi (k ≠ i).  Lastly, completing the leader’s FOC and solving with respect to pk, 
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This substitution and derivation of the leader’s price reaction equation follows very 
closely to that of equation (3.5) 
Combining demand equations and price reaction functions, the following system 
of demand equation exists for empirical estimation. 
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   (3.11 c) 
 where  i =1…n, excluding i = k. 
Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg Games with Cooperative 
Participation 
The above Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg models were derived assuming that 
each market participant was an investor owned firm (IOF).  However, as mentioned 
above, Lilydale is a producer cooperative and consequently may have different 
objectives.  While the objective of an IOF is to maximize profits, the theoretical objective 
of a producer cooperative is to maximize member welfare.  A cooperative objective 
function maximizes member welfare when profits and producer surplus are 
simultaneously maximized (Fulton, 1998).  Given this objective function optimum 
pricing no longer solely utilizes market power to drive higher profits.  The simultaneous 
optimization of profits and producer surplus is achieved in equilibrium when price is set 
equal to marginal cost, the socially optimum level.  Therefore, a cooperative’s price 
reaction function is no longer a function of demand parameters and other firms’ prices, 
but rather a function of marginal cost.   
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In this research the cooperative pricing rule is given as  
  basis mc p i i + =  (3.12) 
where for cooperative i pi  is the optimum retail price, mc is the marginal cost, and the 
basis is the historical difference between price and marginal cost in real terms.  For 
Lilydale this basis is estimated at $6.12/kg.  It is noted that a weekly growth rate of 
0.103% is observed.  While this basis growth may be a reflection of producer price 
increases, it may also illustrate changes in other processing costs such as electricity, 
labor, transportation, etc.  Given the absence of other input cost data, the basis was 
assumed to be an exogenous variable for Lilydale. 
  With the introduction of a new pricing rule for Lilydale, the Bertrand-Nash and 
Stackelberg games must be revisited.  In addition, one must also consider two scenarios. 
Scenario one allows Lilydale to act as a producer cooperative, but other market 
participants still treat Lilydale as an IOF. Scenario two allows Lilydale to act and be 
treated as a producer cooperative by other market participants.  The idea that competing 
firms may treat a cooperative as an IOF, despite declaration of cooperative objectives is 
an advancement in theoretical reasoning not covered in previous literature.  As such it is 
seen as an innovation of this research.  Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg games are 
examined for each scenario. 
Scenario One: Lilydale acts as producer cooperative, but is treated as a  IOF by other 
market participants 
  In the Bertrand game, Lilydale prices according to equation (3.12), while Maple 
Leaf and generic processors price according to equation (3.5). In the Stackelberg game, 
Lilydale prices according to the marginal cost rule and therefore never leads or uses 
foresight to set prices.  Its price reaction function is not dependent upon the actions of 
other processors.  When other market participants lead, they ignore Lilydale’s 
cooperative pricing rule and treat them as an IOF.  Therefore, the following IOF firm 
prices according to equation 3.5 while the leading IOF prices according to 3.10.  
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Scenario Two: Lilydale acts a producer cooperative and is treated as a cooperative by 
other market participants 
  In the Bertrand-Nash game, no market participant’s price reaction function is 
influenced by another firm’s price decision, therefore the Bertrand-Nash game is the 
same as under scenario one.  When Stackelberg games are considered, Lilydale does not 
lead for similar reasons as presented under condition one, but when other IOF firms treat 
Lilydale as a cooperative, their price reaction functions must reflect Lilydale’s 
cooperative pricing function.  Given that Lilydale prices according to marginal cost, its 
optimal price is no longer influenced by  changes in other firms’ prices.  If Lilydale is 
considered to be firm (1) and Maple Leaf and generic processors are considered to be 














.  Recalculating the Stackelberg games the price 
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   (3.14) 
Empirical Model Estimation and Selection 
Data 
For the Canadian chicken market, AC Neilsen© provided retail price and quantity 
data.  As mentioned earlier, the provision of retail level data restricts investigation of a 
fully structural model.  One can only investigate either processor or retailer actions given 
the absence of wholesale prices and quantities.  Since the emphasis in this research  
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surrounds processor actions, we extract processor action from retail level data by 
assuming a retailer fixed markup policy.  
For Canada fresh chicken, weekly retail price and quantity data were available 
from the first week 2001 through to the 44
th week of  2003.  In contrast to Australian 
eggs, the majority of fresh chicken in Canada in marketed as generic product.  Market 
shares on average are approximately 5% Maple Leaf Prime, 1% Lilydale Gold, and 94% 
Generic. Aggregated in the generic category are the following brands: 44
th Street 
Chicken, Exceldor, Flamingo, Janes, Jims, Organic Kitchen, Sausages, St. Hubert, and 
Sterling Silver.  Together, these nine brands make up less than one percent of fresh 
chicken and are not considered as major brands.  Neither weekly, generic or brand 
specific advertising data was available for Canadian chicken.  Average weekly processor 
and producer prices were obtained from Agriculture and Agri-food Canada: Poultry 
Market (2004).  Given the concentration of generic and Maple Leaf processing and 
production in eastern Canada, Ontario producer prices were used.  However, given that 
Ontario processor prices were unavailable, New Brunswick processor prices were used as 
the best available estimate.  For Lilydale, an exclusively western processor, Albertan 
processor and producer prices were used.  Processor prices were used as an estimate of 
marginal cost for processors, rather than producer prices in an attempt to reflect 
processing costs.  Linear interpolation was used to translate monthly CPI estimates, as 
obtained from Statistics Canada, Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management 
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Using Times Series Processor (TSP) software SUR was performed assuming three 
chicken processors: (1) Lilydale, (2) Maple Leaf Prime, and (3) Generic.   Using a generalized 
equation system format, nine SUR estimations were completed; two Bertrand-Nash models and 
seven Stackelberg.  R-squared values (Table 29) illustrate relative good explanatory power for 
demand equations, but rather poor explanatory power for price reaction equations.  This is 
especially present in Lilydale and Generic price reaction equations.  Additionally, own-price 
elasticity of demand, cross-price elasticity of demand, and price reaction equation elasticities 
were calculated at the means. Tables 30 to 32 summarize Marshallian demand elasticities, 
Hicksian demand elasticities, and price reaction elasticities.   
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Table 29: Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg model Goodness of Fit Statistics for Canadian Chicken: R-Squared Values 
      
  Lilydale operates as IOF    Lilydale operates as producer cooperative 
    
Market participants treat 




Market participants treat 
Lilydale as IOF 
  Market participants treat 



















Demand Equation                  
   Lilydale  0.664  0.632  0.656  0.683   0.673   0.651  0.674    0.673  0.673 
   Maple Leaf  0.657  0.659  0.664  0.658   0.663   0.660  0.662    0.663  0.663 
   Generic  0.971  0.971  0.972  0.972   0.974   0.974  0.974    0.974  0.974 
                      
Price Reaction Equation                   
   Lilydale  0.082  0.086  0.067  0.083    0.992    0.992 0.992   0.992  0.992 
   Maple Leaf  0.365  0.450  .0415  0.368    0.290    0.245 0.291   0.290  0.291 
   Generic  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004    0.004    0.004 0.004   0.004  0.004 
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Table 30: Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg model Marshallian own price, cross price, and income elasticities for Canadian 
Chicken: Lilydale treated as both producer cooperative and IOF 
    
  Lilydale operates as IOF    Lilydale operates as producer cooperative 
    
Market participants treat 




Market participants treat 
Lilydale as IOF 
  Market participants treat 



















Own Price Elasticity                   
   ε11  -1.355*  -0.705* -1.341* -1.357*    -1.293*   -1.099*  -1.304*  -1.293*  -1.293* 
   ε22  -0.812*  -0.866* -0.489* -0.810*    -0.693*   -0.700*  -0.698*  -0.690*  -0.695* 
   ε33  -1.187*  -1.217* -1.174* -1.166*    -1.095*   -1.089*  -1.080*  -1.094*  -1.093* 
                      
Cross Price Elasticity                   
   ε12  1.673*  1.727* 2.332* 1.601*    2.231*   3.397*  2.190*    2.231*  2.232* 
   ε13  -0.787* -1.431*  -1.299*  -0.610**    -1.257*   -2.154*  -1.178*  -1.252*  -1.270* 
   ε21  0.255*  0.263* 0.355* 0.244*    0.340*   0.517*  0.333*    0.340*  0.340* 
   ε23  0.376* 0.695*  0.228  0.184    -0.139   -0.171  -0.199  -0.150  -0.127 
   ε31  -0.012* -0.021*  -0.019*  -0.009**    -0.019*   -0.032*  -0.017*  -0.019*  -0.019* 
   ε32  0.037* 0.068*  0.022  0.018    -0.014   -0.017  -0.019  -0.015  -0.012 
                      
Income Elasticity                   
   η1  0.374** 1.037*  0.382**  0.383**    0.705*    0.652* 0.700*    0.705* 0.702* 
   η2  1.164*  0.967* 1.289* 1.136*    1.095*    1.195* 1.091*    1.094* 1.097* 
   η3  0.960*  0.969* 0.947* 0.963*    0.965*    0.957* 0.966*    0.965* 0.965* 
                      
* Significance assumed at P≤  0.05 
** Significance assumed at P≤  0.10 
Where for εij, i  and j take the values: 1-Lilydale, 2-Maple Leaf,  3-Generic 
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Table 31: Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg model Hicksian own price, and cross price elasticities for Canadian Chicken: 
Lilydale treated as both producer cooperative and IOF 
    
  Lilydale operates as IOF    Lilydale operates as producer cooperative 
    
Market participants treat 




Market participants treat 
Lilydale as IOF 
  Market participants treat 



















Own Price Elasticity                   
   ε11  -1.350*  -0.691* -1.335* -1.352*    -1.284*    -1.090* -1.294*    -1.284* -1.284* 
   ε22  -0.710*  -0.781* -0.375* -0.710*    -0.597*    -0.595* -0.602*    -0.593* -0.599* 
   ε33  -0.319*  -0.342* -0.318* -0.296*    -0.222*    -0.224* -0.207*    -0.222* -0.220* 
                      
Cross Price Elasticity                   
   ε12  1.706*  1.818* 2.366* 1.634*    2.293*    3.454* 2.251*    2.293* 2.294* 
   ε13  -0.448  -0.494 -0.954* -0.264    -0.620    -1.565* -0.546    -0.615 -0.635 
   ε21  0.270*  0.276* 0.372* 0.259*    0.354*    0.533* 0.348*    0.354* 0.354* 
   ε23  1.428*  1.569* 1.393* 1.210*    0.851*    0.910* 0.787*    0.839* 0.864* 
   ε31  0.001 -0.008**  -0.007  0.004   -0.006    -0.019* -0.005    -0.006 -0.006 
   ε32  0.121*  0.153* 0.106* 0.103*    0.071*    0.068* 0.066*    0.070* 0.073* 
                      
* Significance assumed at P≤  0.05 
** Significance assumed at P≤  0.10 
Where for εij, i  and j take the values: 1-Lilydale, 2-Maple Leaf,  3-Generic 
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Table 32: Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg model price reaction equation elasticities for Canadian Chicken: Lilydale treated as 
both producer cooperative and IOF 
                   
  Lilydale operates as IOF    Lilydale operates as producer cooperative 
    
Market participants treat 




Market participants treat 
Lilydale as IOF 
  Market participants treat 



















Price reaction Elasticity                   
ε p1(p2)  0.617* 1.521*  0.8699*  0.590*    0.000***    0.000*** 0.000***    0.000*** 0.000*** 
ε p1(p3)  -0.290* -1.260*  -0.4846*  -0.225**    0.000****   0.000*** 0.000***    0.000*** 0.000*** 
ε p2(p1)  0.157* 0.152*  0.5326*  0.150*    0.245*    0.862* 0.239*    0.246* 0.244* 
ε p2(p3)  0.232* 0.401*  0.3414  0.114    -0.100    -0.285 -0.142    -0.109 -0.092 
ε p3(p1)  -0.005* -0.009*  -0.0082*  -0.004**    -0.009*    -0.015* -0.008*    -0.008* -0.009* 
ε p3(p2)  0.015* 0.028*  0.0094  0.008    -0.006    -0.008 -0.009    -0.007 -0.006 
                     
ε p1(mc)  0.140*** 0.106*  0.1395*** 0.140***    0.279***    0.279*** 0.279***    0.279*** 0.279*** 
ε p2(mc)  0.155*** 0.155***  0.0824*  0.155***   0.155***    -0.052 0.155***    0.154* 0.155*** 
ε p3(mc)  0.234*** 0.234***  0.2340***  0.234*    0.234***    0.234*** 0.233*    0.234*** 0.234* 
 
* Significance assume at P≤0.05. 
** Significance assume at P≤0.10. 
***Denotes a constant, rather than an estimated elasticity. 
Where ε pi(pj), is the price reaction equation elasticity for processor i with respect to price .j 
Where ε pi(mc), is the price reaction equation elasticity for processor i with respect to marginal cost. 
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Model Selection 
The literature has approached the selection of an appropriate model from a host of 
choices in a variety of ways.  Vuong (1989) illustrates an in-depth selection criteria by 
presenting likelihood ratio tests for non-nested hypothesis testing.  Simpler approaches 
also using likelihood ratios simply state the best model as the one with the lowest log-
likelihood ratio.  However, given that SUR estimation does not use a likelihood function 
for convergence and parameter estimation, the best fitting model may be interpreted as 
the one with the lowest sum of squared errors (Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chingtagunta, 
1996). 
In selecting the appropriate model for Canadian, concern exists about how well 
predicted prices approach observed prices.  The squared differences between observed 
and predicted prices can be interpreted as squared errors. Summing these squared errors 
from each price equation it is possible to calculate a sum of squared errors.  The model 
with the lowest sum of squared errors is thus interpreted as the best model.  The next  
table illustrates the sum of squared errors by price equation and in total.  94  
Table 33: Sum of Squared Errors for Canadian Fresh Chicken Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg Models by Price Reaction 
Equation and in Total 
                     
  Lilydale operates as IOF    Lilydale operates as producer cooperative 
    
Market participants treat 




Market participants treat 
Lilydale as IOF 
  Market participants treat 



















Price reaction Equation                   
Lilydale 558.1  8226.1  19676.6 513.4   15.1   15.1 15.1   15.1 15.1
Maple Leaf  637.9  1130.9  20624.2 590.0   533.4   6873.4 506.2   540.5 531.2
Generic 22.4 19.5 23.4 23.4   28.9   26.4 31.1   28.9 29.3
                     






In Canadian we reject Bertrand-Nash behavior and confirm the identity of a 
Stackelberg leader.  In Canada, the leader is generic (with Lilydale acting as a 
producer cooperative but being treated as a IOF).   
In Canada, the selection of a preferred model solely by lowest sum of squared 
errors may seem rather arbitrary given that three other models also express sum of 
squared errors in the mid to upper five hundred mark.  These models include the 
Bertrand Nash model where Lilydale acts like a producer cooperative, and the Maple 
Leaf and Generic Stackelberg models where Lilydale acts and is treated as a producer 
cooperative.  Therefore to support the selection of the preferred model market 
information is also used.  Given that generic commands 94% of the Canadian market, 
it seems logical that it may determine market trends as the Stackelberg leader.  By 
processes of elimination this removes the Bertrand and Maple Leaf Stackelberg 
models.  Between the remaining two Generic Stackelberg models one must decide 
between the situation where Lilydale is treated as an IOF or a producer cooperative.  
In this decision cooperative theory favors the Generic Stackelberg model where 
Lilydale is treated as an IOF.  As a producer cooperative, Lilydale should practice 
marginal cost pricing in order to maximize member welfare.  However, Lilydale often 
charges the highest market price.  As a cooperative, in order to regularly charge prices 
above other market participants, Lilydale must observe much higher marginal costs.  
This is doubtful given the availability of similar processing technology and similar 
producer prices.  Therefore, their demands for higher prices are seen by other market 
participants as actions similar to an IOF which may be attempting to maximize profits 
rather than member welfare.  Remember, of course, that member welfare includes 
profits and producer surplus. 
  To further support model selection, it is useful to investigate parameter 
estimates and their congruency with economic theory.  From economic theory, two 
readily applied parameter constraints revolve around negative own-price elasticities 
and positive own-product advertising elasticities.  Since the sign and magnitude of 
these elasticities are largely determined by parameter estimates it is important that 
parameter estimates have the appropriate sign.  For own-price elasticities to be  
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negative, the sign of the own-price parameter (γii) must be negative.  In all models for 
Canada, own-price parameters readily conform to this constraint by yielding negative 
own-price elasticities.  As such own price parameters present no innate bias against 
any particular model.  For own-product advertising elasticities to be positive own-
product advertising parameters (λii) must also be positive.    
Model Selection and Processor Strategic Interaction 
The selection of the best fitting model for a particular market necessitates the 
rejection of Bertrand-Nash behavior in Canada.  The market data indicates that, in 
terms of volume and value, generic processors in Canada lead the market.   
Additionally in Canada the preferred model has Lilydale acting as a cooperative but 
other market participants still treating Lilydale as an IOF. While these games may be 
the preferred model, what do they mean? 
The rejection of Bertrand behavior illustrates that the leading firms are using 
foresight to optimize their profits.  Given demand and cost conditions, they anticipate 
follower price reaction and set their prices accordingly. Followers observe the 
leader’s decision and set prices in a reactionary fashion.  This dynamic relationship 
may seem counterintuitive to the one-shot game modeled in this research, but is 
supported in the literature.  From the literature three explanations emerge which 
suggest why firms may follow the more accommodating leader/follower relationship 
rather than the more competitive Bertrand-Nash interaction. 
In the first explanation, a few theoretical models and experimental pieces 
suggest that when game participants meet repeatedly, they move away from 
competitive or Bertrand Nash behavior to more cooperative outcomes, Stackelberg 
outcomes (Axelrod, 1982; Kreps, 1982; Friedman, 1990).  Over infinite time 
horizons, repeated game play easily evolves to more collusive behavior but more 
importantly so does repeated play in finite horizons.  These researchers speculate the 
evolution of several simple to formulate and easy to implement monitoring and 
punishment strategies.  These strategies are designed to promote higher profits for all 
participants if participants interact according to their competition’s expectations.  
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A second explanation for observing Stackelberg behavior may be multimarket 
contact (Bernhein and Whinston, 1990).  In Canada we modeled fresh chicken 
consumption.  Frozen chicken and restaurant demands were not included and make 
up a significant portion of chicken demand.  The primary assumption behind this 
theory is that profits are higher under cooperative action.  Therefore, noncooperative 
behavior in one market reduces the credibility of players signaling willingness to 
cooperate in other markets.  In turn, Bertrand-Nash behavior in one market may force 
non-cooperative behavior in other markets and lower profits for all participants.   
The third explanation illustrating the evolution towards Stackelberg 
interaction rather than Bertrand-Nash revolves around product positioning.  There are 
two opposing views concerning how firms should position their products in attribute 
space.  The first (Hoteling,1927) suggests that firms should position products as far 
away from competing products in order to serve different market segments.  The 
largest brand then becomes the one serving the largest market segment, however, the 
most proportionately profitable firm becomes the one that best provides its segment 
with the attributes it promised at the lowest product cost.  Conversely, Klemperer 
(1992) advocates head-to-head competition.  Under head-to-head competition, when 
firms market similar products, they share consumers with their rivals.  Consequently 
the temptation to increase prices is countered by movement of consumers to the lower 
priced good.  Evidently rivals must match price decreases as consumers will again 
migrate to the lower priced item.  Therefore a strategy using price decreases to gain 
market share ultimately lowers market prices and profits for all participants.  To see 
the implications of this last explanation let us examine price elasticities. 
When investigating own-price elasticities, product space theory suggests that 
lower own-product elasticity products are viewed by consumers as being further away 
in product space.  This means the consumers see them as differentiated products 
serving a unique or slightly segregated market segment.  Conversely proportionately 
higher own-price elasticity products in consumer space are viewed as more readily 
competing with each other.  Given the illustrated elasticities, choice of appropriate 
product positioning strategy is determined by how participants view competition.  If  
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participants view niche creation as softening competition, moving towards more 
collusive behavior, and observe a low own-price elasticity, they will want to position 
their product as differentiated.  In Canada, Maple Leaf readily displays this 
assumption.  While not being the leader, Maple Leaf has recently taken an active 
stance to differentiate its product from others through selective feeding programs.  
Their vegetable-grain-fed birds are readily marketed as an alternative to conventional 
chicken, which is readily produced on rations that may contain animal by products.  
As such they apply poultry rearing rations as a differentiation technique, a technique 
which allows them to consistently demand higher prices over generic.   
To investigate cross-price elasticity relationships the following two tables 
summarize Marshallian elasticities for our preferred models.  The illustration of 
Marshallian elasticities reveals the gross affect of both consumer substitution and 
incomes effects.  The following discussion interprets gross demand.   Elasticities not 
significant at P ≤ 0.10 are assumed to be zero. 
Table 34: Summary of Significant Marshallian Elasticities for Canadian Fresh 
Chicken Stackelberg-Generic Model where Lilydale Acts as a Cooperative but is 
Treated as an IOF 
 Demand  for: 
 Lilydale Maple  Leaf Generic
Price of:       
   Lilydale  -1.304  .333  -0.017 
   Maple Leaf 2.190  -0.698  0 
   Generic  -1.178  0  -1.080 
      
Significance assumed at P ≤  0.10
 
Both positive and negative cross price elasticities are observed for the Canadian 
market.  Non-significant results as illustrated by zero cross-price elasticities, illustrate 
no relationship between products. Given the assumption of rational firms, a 
requirement for profit maximizing firms is the observation of positive cross price 
elasticities. In this fashion, price increases made by another processor result in 
increased demand for own product.  In Canada, Lilydale’s cross price elasticities 
make it proportionality more sensitive to the other major branded product, Maple  
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Leaf, than Maple Leaf is to it. They have positioned themselves as the more price 
sensitive branded product yet regularly charge the highest price. 
To further investigate the relationship between goods, Hicksian demand 
elasticities are also considered.  Theory suggests that cross-price elasticities for 
substitute goods should be positive.  Since products considered in this research are 
normally considered substitutes we have a violation of expectation and actuality when 
Marshallian demand elasticities are used.  In all cases, wherever a negative 
Marshallian  ij ε  is observed, there is a corresponding negative  ji ε . As such the goods 
are seen as gross complements.  Therefore products observing this condition assume 
that consumers will buy some of their competitor’s product when their own is 
purchased. Such is the case for Lilydale and generic,.  However, the use of 
Marshallian demand elasticities combines both substitution and incomes effects.  If 
one were to separate out only the substitution effect than Hicksian demand elasticities 
should be used.  In tables 16 and 17 Hicksian demand elasticities for the preferred 
models are presented. 
Table 35: Summary of Significant Hicksian Elasticities for Canadian Fresh 
Chicken Stackelberg-Generic Model where Lilydale Acts as a Cooperative but is 
Treated as an IOF 
 Demand  for: 
 Lilydale Maple  Leaf Generic
Price of:       
   Lilydale  -1.294*  0.348 0 
   Maple Leaf 2.251*  -0.602* 0.066 
   Generic  0  0.787  -0.207* 
      
Significance assumed at P ≤  0.10
 
Previously assumed gross complements, Lilydale and generic, exhibit no net 
substitution affect.  Therefore, their gross substitution effect can be attributed to an 
income effect rather than a substitution effect. 
In Canada, the elasticity examination illustrates Maple Leaf to be a proactive 
brand seeking to differentiate itself from generic and other brands.  Being one of the 
few brands nationally represented, its vegetable grain-feeding production and  
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promotion program has actively carved out a market niche allowing them to demand 
higher prices then generic.  Conversely, Lilydale a proportionately smaller brand, has 
not established itself well.  It displays a positive cross-price elasticity relationship, 
which makes it more sensitive to Maple Leaf than Maple Leaf to them, and a negative 
cross-price elasticity relationship which consumers buying Lilydale product are more 
sensitive to changes in generic prices then when consumers buy generic product and 
Lilydale prices change.  Generic product establishes itself as relatively non-
competitive with both Lilydale and Maple Leaf.  This is likely the result of their 
overwhelmingly large market share.  
Synthetic Model Development 
To assess the potential impact of generic advertising and research in the 
Canadian market, this study uses a synthetic model to vary advertising and research 
investments.  The effectiveness of these investments is derived through comparison to 
a base model.  First, it is necessary to illustrate the development of the synthetic 
model before we discuss the base model and synthetic model simulations. 
In the synthetic model, a linear demand system incorporating symmetry and 
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 (5.1) 
where for processor i q, p ,and advg, represent quantity, price, and generic advertising.  
γij and λg are parameter coefficients for price and generic advertising.  The model 
utilizes demand elasticity estimates from the preferred model in each market to derive 
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To simulate the processor conduct, price reaction functions (specific to the preferred 
model in each market) are also included.  These follow the form previously illustrated 






− = .  Price reaction equations also 
included a constant. The constant was calculated as the difference between the actual 
price and the price calculated by the parameters derived from the demand equations. 
These constants where used to calibrate the model to yield initial starting values.  An 
alternative method to calibrate the model would be to simultaneously solve the 
demand parameters in both the demand and price reaction equations.  This proved 
exceedingly difficult given that some parameters often were squared terms.  As such 
the complicated algebra was determined to be beyond the scope of this research and 
the simpler method was adopted.  For an additional element of realism in the model, 
supply equations were also included.  Supply equations are also required for the 
investigation of research effectiveness.  The supply equations were specified as linear 
functions of quantity and can be represented as follows: 
  i t jR q g h fp + + = *  (5.5) 
where fp represents producer price, qt represents the sum of all producer production, 
Ri represents investment in research, and h, g and j are estimated parameters.  Similar 
to demand equations supply elasticities were used to derived parameter estimates.    
For Canadian chicken the supply estimation was not possible for an over-lapping 
period.  Given that Canada’s industry is a supply managed industry, supply equation 
estimation requires the use of quota values in addition to quantities.  Weekly quota 
value estimates were unavailable for the period of the study.  Instead a historical  
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annual supply elasticity estimation of 0.299 was used (Zachariah, Fox, and Brinkman, 
1989).  It should be noted that the backward derivation of demand and supply 
parameters from elasticities were calculated for a base model and then held constant 
in other models where advertising and research investment were varied.   
In order to introduce real life variability and error Monte Carlo simulations 
where completed.  These simulations where used to calculated 95% confidence 
intervals.  These confidence intervals allow one to better understand the likelihood of 
an occurrence.  In this research Monte Carlo simulations were completed by 
including error terms on both the advertising and research parameters. These errors 
where randomly generated from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 0.004 for advertising and 0.003 for research.  These estimates of 
standard deviation are utilized from previous research as presented by Brester and 
Schroeder (1995) and Alston, Marra, Pardey, and Wyatt (2000).  Simulations where 
replicated 1000 times.  From these replications, both mean quantity and prices 
predictions, as well as confidence intervals can be calculated.  Table 36 illustrates a 
summary of the equations estimated in each synthetic model. 
Base Model and Synthetic Model Simulations 
The base model in both markets is used as a basis for comparison.  It assumes 
initial prices, quantities, generic advertising investment, research investment, as well 
as advertising and research elasticities.  Initial prices and quantities are indicated in 
Table 37 .  Initial investments in advertising and research are set at $500,000 apiece 
and initial advertising and research elasticities are set at 0.005.  Initials investments of 
$500,000, solely funded by producers, represent a check-off of $0.002/kg for 
Canadian producers. 
Given this base model, four simulations for the market were considered.  Each 
simulation increased either generic advertising or research investment by 50% or 
100%.  Since these simulations consider similar investments, it is possible to compare 
the effectiveness of investments in generic advertising versus research.  Synthetic 
model simulation results are presented in Tables 38 through 44.  Discussion of results 
proceeds in the next section.  
  103
Investment in Generic Advertising versus Research 
In the synthetic model, investments in both generic advertising or research were 
considered.  Initially, a base model is assumed to produce parameter estimates.  Given these 
conditions, increasing levels of advertising and research are individually considered as they 
affect both producers and processors alike. 
  From a producer point of view investments in generic advertising are seen to 
be beneficial to Canadian producers, research in Canada is counterproductive (Tables 
38, 39, 40 and 41).  In Canada the success of advertising investment is largely due to 
the increase in quantity marketed as farm prices remain relatively stagnant (Table 37).  
The increase in quantity more than offsets the increase investment expenditure.    The 
increase in quantity is not great enough to compensate for the increase investment 
expenditure.  When considering returns to research, Canada exhibits negative returns 
on investment (Table 39 and 40).  While investment in research does spur on quantity 
growth, it has an opposing effect on farm price.  The increase in quantity marketed is 
not substantive enough to offset decreasing farm prices and increasing investment 
expenditure. As a result, advertising investment is beneficial in Canada, while 
research investment is negative.   In reality, if one considers prices and quantities as 
strategic variables in oligopoly markets, one must also consider advertising as a 
strategic variable.  Therefore, the optimum level of advertising for producers may 
also be a function of the branded advertising strategies followed by processors.  The 
suggestion of advertising games must also consider previous discussion on branded 
and generic advertising as exhibiting either cooperative or antagonistic relationships. 
  In the above paragraph, generic advertising and research were investigated 
from a producer perspective, but how do these investment affect processors?  This 
discussion arises largely from arguments concerning investment responsibility.  If 
processors and producers both benefit from investments in generic advertising or 
research, then processors too have incentive to fund advertising investment.  This has 
been speculated by some producer groups as a means to offset producer investment 
costs.  In Canada processor returns marginally improve from investments in 
advertising and are a wash when considering investments in research (Table 41).  The  
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success of advertising for Canadian processors is due to increasing retail prices and 
quantities.  These gains are large enough to offset rising marginal costs (Table 37).  
When considering research investment in Canada, the gains in quantity and retail 
price are not large enough a produce positive return for all processors.  Rising 
marginal cost influences some processors more than others and produces negative 
returns. It is noted that in the investigation of both produce and processor returns the 
confidence intervals seem relatively narrow.  In Table 34 an ad hoc analysis of 
Canadian fresh chicken illustrates the span of confidence intervals to be directly 
related to the assumed standard deviation used in each synthetic model.  The narrow 
confidence intervals observed in this research are likely due to the small parameters 
rather than the assumed standard deviation. 
As a side investigation, processor markets shares were also examined (Tables 
41, 42, 43, and 44).  In this investigation market shares are seen to be static.  They do 
not fluctuate from either investments in generic advertising or research.  This follows 
largely by assumption.  In the synthetic model simulation only one advertising and 
one research elasticity were assumed.  This means that changes in either affect all 
processors similarly.  Further research may propose multiple elasticities, unique to 
each processor, to further investigate market share distortions.   
Summary 
Synthetic models were created to investigate investment in both generic 
advertising and research and development.  While producers in Canada are shown to 
favor investment in advertising, no consistently positive results are achieved for 
research in Canada. Processors in both countries remain only marginally influenced 
by either.  Standard deviation sensitivity analysis illustrates that confidence intervals 
may remain relatively narrow because of the small parameters used in the simulation, 







Table 36: Synthetic Model Equation Summary 
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% Return=( fp Simulation*Qt Simulation – fp Base Model*Qt Base Model)/ 
                ( Increase in Expenditure over Base Model) 
Processor 
Return  % Returni=( p Simulation*qi  Simulation – p Base Model*qi Base Model) 
1 Used for IOF Firms 
2 Used for Producer Coop  




Table 37: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Advertising Investment: Prices and Quantities 
               


















Bound Std  Dev 
                 
Quantity (000’s kg)             
   q1  931.3  932.8 932.8 932.8  7.8E-02    933.5 933.5 933.6  1.2E-01 
   q2  8643.9  8652.4 8652.4 8652.5  4.5E-01    8656.6 8656.5 8656.7  6.8E-01 
   q3  170289.0  170386.1 170385.3 170387.0 5.1E+00  170433.5 170432.2 170434.7 7.7E+00
                
Prices ($/kg)              
   p1  9.80  9.82 9.82 9.82  1.1E-03    9.83 9.83 9.83  1.6E-03 
   p2  10.28  10.30 10.30 10.30  9.5E-04    10.31 10.31 10.31  1.4E-03 
   p3  6.25  6.26 6.26 6.26  3.5E-04    6.26 6.26 6.26  5.3E-04 
   mc1 2.82 2.83 2.83 2.83  4.6E-04    2.83 2.83 2.83  6.9E-04 
   mc2 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90  1.8E-04    2.91 2.90 2.91  2.7E-04 
   mc3 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.90  1.8E-04    2.91 2.90 2.91  2.7E-04 
   fp1 1.62  1.63 1.63 1.63  4.6E-04    1.63 1.63 1.63  6.9E-04 
   fp2 1.70  1.70 1.70 1.70  1.8E-04    1.71 1.70 1.71  2.7E-04 
   fp3  1.70  1.70 1.70 1.70  1.8E-04    1.71 1.70 1.71  2.7E-04 
               
qi, pi, mci, and fpi represent the quantities and prices specific to firm i, where i takes the values 1-Lilydale, 2-Maple Leaf, and 3-Generic. 
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Table 38: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Research Investment: Prices and Quantities 
               


















Bound  Std Dev 
                 
Quantity (000’s kg)              
   q1  931.3  931.8 931.8 931.8  2.1E-02    932.4 932.4 932.4  4.1E-02 
   q2  8643.9  8646.0 8646.0 8646.0  9.2E-02    8648.3 8648.3 8648.3  1.8E-01 
   q3  170289.0  170432.1 170431.1 170433.1 6.0E+00  170581.6 170579.7 170583.5 1.2E+01
                
Prices ($/kg)              
   p1  9.80  9.79 9.79 9.79  2.9E-04    9.79 9.79 9.79  5.5E-04 
   p2  10.28  10.27 10.27 10.27  2.5E-04    10.27 10.27 10.27  4.9E-04 
   p3  6.25  6.25 6.25 6.25  2.0E-04    6.24 6.24 6.24  3.9E-04 
   mc1 2.82 2.81 2.81 2.81  4.5E-04    2.80 2.80 2.80  8.8E-04 
   mc2 2.90 2.89 2.89 2.89  4.1E-04    2.88 2.88 2.88  7.9E-04 
   mc3 2.90 2.89 2.89 2.89  4.1E-04    2.88 2.88 2.88  7.9E-04 
   fp1 1.62  1.61 1.61 1.61  4.5E-04    1.60 1.60 1.60  8.8E-04 
   fp2 1.70  1.69 1.69 1.69  4.1E-04    1.68 1.68 1.68  7.9E-04 
   fp3 1.70  2.89 2.89 2.89  4.1E-04    2.88 2.88 2.88  7.9E-04 
               
qi, pi, mci, and fpi represent the quantities and prices specific to firm i, where i takes the values 1-Lilydale, 2-Maple Leaf, and 3-Generic. 
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Table 39: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Advertising Investment: Producer Returns 
                     
  Base Model    Advertising Investment $7500,000    Advertising Investment $1,000,000 
       
95% Confidence 













                    
Net Return (000’s of $)                  
Lilydale  1508.2   1519.2  1519.1  1519.3    1524.3  1524.2  1524.4 
Maple or 
Generic  304185.9   304967.5  304960.8 304974.2   305348.8  305338.7 305359.0 
Canadian 
Average 305694.2    306486.7  306479.9 306493.5  306873.1 306862.8 306883.4 
                    
Percent Return on Investment                 
Lilydale -    748 741  755    520 515 526 
Maple or 
Generic  -   214  212  217    134  132  136 
Canadian 
Average -    217  214  220    136  134  138 
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Table 40: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Research Investment: Producer Returns 
                     
  Base Model    Research Investment $7500,000    Research Investment $1,000,000 
       
95% Confidence 













                    
Net Return (000’s of $)                  
Lilydale  1508.2   1499.6  1499.5  1499.6    1489.9  1489.8  1490.1 
Maple or 
Generic  304185.9   302696.6  302683.0 302710.2   301136.3  301109.9 301162.7 
Canadian 
Average 305694.2    304196.2  304182.5 304209.9  302626.2 302599.7 302652.8 
                    
Percent Return on Investment                 
Lilydale -    -769 -775  -763    -808 -813 -802 
Maple or 
Generic  -   -699  -704  -693    -713  -718  -708 
Canadian 
Average -    -699  -705  -694    -714  -719  -708 
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Table 41: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Advertising Investment: Processor Returns 
  Base Model    Advertising Investment $750,000    Advertising Investment $1,000,000 
        
95% Confidence 
Interval    
95% Confidence 
Interval 









                  
Net Return (000’s of $)               
   Lilydale  9123.8    9160.8  9160.5  9161.1  9177.3  9176.8  9177.7 
   Maple Leaf  88859.3    89102.9  89100.8  89105.0  89222.0  89218.8  89225.2 
   Generic  1064306.3    1066049.3 1066034.3 1066064.3   1066900.2 1066877.5 1066922.8
                  
Percent Increase Over Base               
   Lilydale  -    0.406  0.403  0.409    0.586  0.581  0.591 
   Maple Leaf  -    0.274  0.272  0.276    0.408  0.405  0.412 
   Generic  -    0.164  0.162  0.165    0.244  0.242  0.246 
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Table 42: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Research Investment: Processor Returns 
  Base Model    Research Investment $750,000    Research Investment $1,000,000 
        
95% Confidence 
Interval    
95% Confidence 
Interval 









                   
Net Return (000’s of $)               
   Lilydale  9123.8    9125.7  9125.7 9125.8    9124.2 9124.1 9124.4 
   Maple Leaf  88859.3    88829.5  88829.0 88830.0    88798.7 88797.7 88799.7 
   Generic  1064306.3    1064379.0 1064367.3 1064390.8   1064453.6 1064430.7 1064476.4
                   
Percent Increase Over Base           
   Lilydale  -    0.021  0.020  0.022    0.005  0.003  0.006 
   Maple Leaf  -    -0.034  -0.034  -0.033  -0.068  -0.069  -0.067 
   Generic  -    0.007  0.006  0.008    0.014  0.012  0.016 
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Table 43: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Advertising Investment: Processor Market Share 
  Base Model    Advertising Investment $750,000    Advertising Investment $1,000,000 
        
95% Confidence 
Interval    
95% Confidence 
Interval 









                  
Market Share by Dollars               
      Lilydale  0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Maple Leaf  0.08    0.08  0.08  0.08    0.08  0.08  0.08 
      Generic  0.92    0.92 0.92 0.92    0.92 0.92 0.92 
                  
Market Share by Quantity               
      Lilydale  0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Maple Leaf  0.05    0.05  0.05  0.05    0.05  0.05  0.05 
      Generic  0.95    0.95 0.95 0.95    0.95 0.95 0.95 
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Table 44: Canadian Synthetic Model with Increasing Research Investment: Processor Market Share 
  Base Model    Research Investment $750,000    Research Investment $1,000,000 
        
95% Confidence 
Interval    
95% Confidence 
Interval 









                  
Market Share by Dollars               
      Lilydale  0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Maple Leaf  0.08    0.08  0.08  0.08    0.08  0.08  0.08 
      Generic  0.92    0.92 0.92 0.92    0.92 0.92 0.92 
                  
Market Share by Quantity               
      Lilydale  0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01    0.01 0.01 0.01 
   Maple Leaf  0.05    0.05  0.05  0.05    0.05  0.05  0.05 
      Generic  0.95    0.95 0.95 0.95    0.95 0.95 0.95 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this research a number of different studies have been summarized. The common theme 
in all of the studies is the complexity of consumer behaviour with regard to chicken 
products within Canada. Within the chicken industry economic analysis in the past has 
tended to focus on the aggregate demand for chicken, as a commodity. The results 
reported suggest that at the consumer level, chicken fresh and frozen products are not 
perceived to be perfect substitutes, within a narrow category such as fresh chicken 
breasts, they are not perceived as even close substitutes, within the fresh category 
branded products such as those developed by Lilydale and Maple Leaf are not perceived 
as perfect substitutes. As well,  an initial look at the demand for individual chicken 
products by household suggests that there is far from a common buying pattern across 
Canadian households, even within a single province.  
Why do we need to know about consumer behaviour with regard to disaggregated 
chicken products? Initial simulation results have shown that the impact of shocks such as 
a change in beef price or the necessity to suddenly reduce exports ( perhaps due to an 
outbreak of Avian flu) could affect different sectors, products and firms within the 
industry very differently, driven by the consumer substitutability of the various chicken 
products. Firm level behaviour can directly affect the aggregate level of chicken product 
sold and the returns to producers from investments in things such as generic advertising 
and basic research. Although there is a lot more research to do (current research on 
pricing strategic games in frozen chicken products, for example) clearly a deeper 
understanding of the games being played in the Canadian chicken marketplace will 
enhance our ability to model policy and exogenous shocks to the sector.  
One of the original aims of the research was to model the consumer demand for 
production attributes (free run, organic, etc.) . Unfortunately the data did not support this 
type of analysis; until this month the most recent household level data purchases available 
for study (purchased through a research grant from the Alberta Prion Research Institute 
obtained in 2006) contained far too few products that were so identified and many 
products for which the production attributes could not be identified at all. In some senses 
the analysis of fresh chicken products from Maple Leaf as opposed to Lilydale might be 
perceived as a competition between different types of production systems (based on the  
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advertising campaigns of Maple Leaf). For a while shortly after May 2003, when BSE 
was found in an Alberta cow, Maple Leaf advertised its meat products as coming from 
animals that were 100% grain fed; Lilydale only referred to vegetable product fed without 
the numerical descriptor. However this is a very subtle difference for consumer to grasp 
onto. With a more recent data purchase of data on household purchases of meat from 
January 2006 to June 2007 to augment the earlier data set and the ability to get more 
product description from the UPC codes associated with the individual products, further 
analysis of demand for production attributes might be possible in the future.  
Further analysis of the results reported in this paper are possible in a number of different 
categories: 
-  disaggregation of more individual products by brand 
-  different categorization of chicken products by nutrient content ( using detailed 
product descriptions from Canadian stores) 
-  longer analysis over the years 200 to 2007 
-  more simulations of the two models reported under a wider variety of exogenous 
or policy shocks 
-  different model specifications under market structures established by estimation 
for a wider variety of chicken products 
-  further analysis of the impact of new product introductions into the marketplace – 
do they displace current products, why do some not succeed? (ongoing in an 
existing research project at the University of Alberta).  
 
The results reported to date suggest that investment strategies and different policy 
outcomes will all be affected by and enhanced by a deeper understanding of the Canadian 
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